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16 December 1993



JPRS Report

Arms Control

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JPRS-TAC-93-022

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**Jiang Discusses Arms Control, Military View
Toward U.S.**

*OW2111050293 Tokyo KYODO in English 0428 GMT
21 Nov 93*

[Text] Seattle, Nov. 20 KYODO—Chinese President Jiang Zemin Saturday [20 November] gave high marks to his trip to the United States, describing his summit meeting with President Bill Clinton as a "good start" in healing strained bilateral relations.

Speaking to reporters before winding up his four-day trip to the U.S. west coast, Jiang said he and Clinton agreed in their meeting Friday to settle bilateral differences by maintaining dialogue.

"We had a good talk. The atmosphere was friendly. The attitude was frank. It was a constructive meeting," Jiang said.

Jiang was in Seattle to attend an informal summit of leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

China, which joined APEC in 1991 along with Taiwan and Hong Kong, regards the regional group as a "flexible and loose organization" to promote open trade in the Asia-Pacific region, he said.

Jiang brushed aside news reports that Chinese military leaders take the United States as potential enemy, saying, "if that is the case, why should I have come to the United States?"

Jiang also contended that China's military outlays are "very small," saying it is about 7 billion dollars compared to 260 billion dollars in the United States.

Asked whether China would abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Jiang said Beijing is ready to hold talks with the United States over the issue.

The United States has imposed limited economic sanctions on Beijing because of China's alleged violation of its MTCR commitment by selling missile technology to Pakistan.

The Chinese commitment to abide by the international arms control pact is "predicated" on the removal of U.S. sanctions against China, Jiang said.

Commenting on China's position on the territorial dispute in a cluster of islands in the oil-rich South China Sea, Jiang reaffirmed that China wants to shelve the dispute and jointly develop the natural resources with other countries with territorial claims in the area.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Zagreb Radio Says Bosnians Using Chlorine

LD3011171693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Nov 93

[Zdenko Vranjes reporting for Croatian Radio]

[Excerpt] The Muslim Army is using chlorine-charged missiles in its attacks on [Croat] villages north of Zepce. According to the Croatian Defense Council's [HVO] 111th Brigade [based in Zepce], many casualties have been registered in this area where infantry and artillery clashes are continuing. In its offensive on HVO-controlled villages between Maglaj and Zavidovici [both Muslim-held towns] the Muslim Army is trying to link up its forces from the two towns. [passage omitted]

IRAN

CW Marshlands Probe

NC1711121193 Paris AFP in English 1112 GMT
17 Nov 93

[Text] Tehran, Nov 17 (AFP)—A team of UN experts on Wednesday conducted on-site investigations in Iraq's southern marshlands on allegations of Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against Shiite Muslims, informed sources said.

They said the team of weapons experts and physicians had left early Wednesday for an unspecified location in the areas allegedly contaminated from chemical attacks.

A member of the mission however, who asked not be named, refused to provide any information on the investigation. "The probe is continuing and we have to wait for the end results," he said.

The 10-member team representing the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on disarming Iraq arrived here Sunday and left for a border area in Iran's Khuzestan province on Tuesday, an Iraqi opposition group based in Tehran said.

The Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) told AFP that the team was expected to question witnesses and dwellers of the marshlands and conduct soil and water tests in allegedly contaminated areas.

The delegation has already questioned several witnesses over the attacks in Tehran, according to SAIRI.

SAIRI has accused the Iraqi army of using chemical weapons against marsh Arabs since last October. Baghdad has repeatedly denied the charges.

CWC Envoy Visits

LD1611172593 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT
16 Nov 93

[Text] Ian Kenyan, executive secretary of the Preliminary Commission on Chemical Weapons at The Hague, met with Foreign Minister Velayati this afternoon.

During the meeting Mr. Velayati referred to the new convention on banning chemical weapons. He said now that the convention has been signed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries it is expected that the present obstacles to the world's industrial development may be removed.

He then referred to the fact that during the last decade Iran has been one of the most seriously affected victims of these types of weapons, and expressed hope that the convention will be implemented fully, and that the powerful countries will not use it as a political instrument to further their specific aims and objectives.

In an interview with our correspondent, Ian Kenyan said about the convention's executive powers: In accordance with the provisions of the convention, within ten years all countries must destroy their chemical weapons and halt their production.

He was asked what measures have been taken in the convention to control certain powerful countries, which on one hand are themselves manufacturers of the world's chemical weapons, and on the other hand issue resolutions against their use and production? He replied:

They are mostly Western countries, and to control them we have prepared a law in the convention under which the transfer of chemical weapons technology from one country to another is prohibited. This convention complements the 1925 convention prohibiting the production and distribution of chemical weapons, which was signed by 154 countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran last Dey [corresponding to 22 December-20 January 1992-3].

RUSSIA

Joint Project To Use SLBMs for Space Launches

94WC0008B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 40, 1 Oct 93 p 8

[Article by Gherman Lomanov: "Americans To Join Missiles' Recycling Project 'Priboi'"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] The Sea Launch Investors corporation and the RAMCON association have set up a joint company which will use re-equipped sea-based ballistic missiles for commercial launchings.

The implementation of the START I and START II treaties will call for an immense input on Russia's part. To compensate in part for the state's expenditures on the elimination of strategic arms, a vast commercial programme has been drawn up to be known as "Missiles—Housing." All work on the recycling of sea-based missiles has been entrusted to the association RAMCON ("conversion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles").

MN FILE

The idea of RAMCON's establishment was suggested by Igor Velichko, general designer of a state rocket centre known as the "Academician V.P. Makeyev Design Office," and supported by Naval Command. In keeping with the RF government's Resolution No. 820 dated October 22, 1992, on the implementation of the "Missiles—Housing" programme the association will take over (as they are phased out of service) the missiles, ship complexes and their equipment to be eliminated, as well as missiles and equipment whose terms of guarantee have expired.

In the period when the START I and START II treaties will be in force (between 1997 and 2002) it is envisaged to utilize upwards of a thousand sea-based ballistic missiles SS-N-6, SS-N-8 and SS-N-18.

Some of which after being re-equipped will be used for commercial launchings which RAMCON sees as the main source of revenues from the conversion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). To the same use will be put the re-equipped missiles SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 (PCM-52 and PCM-54) with expiring operational terms which do not come under jurisdiction of the START I and START II treaties. This orientation in RAMCON's activities is envisaged in the comprehensive programme for the reduction, elimination and utilization of SLBMs and the systems of sea-based rocket complexes approved by RF Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev on June 11, 1993.

Of course, it is not easy to break into the space market—practically the whole of it (c. 1.5 billion dollars a year) has been divided among the European consortium Arianespace (56%) and the American firms Martin Marietta, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas (33%).

Russia's share despite possessing 60% of capacities for commercial launchings, comes to a mere 3% and whilst the schedule for launchings has been fully signed up until 1995—there are roughly 2.5 times more proposals for putting a satellite into orbit than the applications accepted by firms dealing with launchings.

Nevertheless RAMCON thinks highly of the re-equipped SLBMs' competitive power. There are at least three reasons for optimism. First, the V.P. Makeyev engineering design office possesses a broad spectrum of different carriers (see Table) making it possible to offer customers a diverse range of services. Second, when launched from the surface of water (project Priboi) the re-equipped sea-based missiles do not require launching pads and it is possible to launch satellites from any latitude and along any trajectory. Third, preliminary estimates have shown that RAMCON is in a position to ensure its prices for launchings at 7.5% below world prices and amass a substantial profit.

The promising nature of this sector of space services is also corroborated by the fact that RAMCON has the benefits of active cooperation with the US corporation Sea Launch Investors which on August 29, 1993, signed a contract on the establishment of a joint corporation Sea Launch Service. The SLI is headed by Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, a professional who can better appraise the advantages of Russian SLBMs. Notably, Russia alone has optimized the launching of liquid-propellant rocket engines in water—this is essential because the Priboi rocket must be launched not from submarines or surface ships but directly from sea surface. The potential of the enterprises belonging to the association and engaged for more than 30 years in the development and manufacture of SLBMs, has been highly appraised by rocket developers the world over.

All financing for the Priboi project comes from the funds the Sea Launch Service corporation receives from domestic and foreign investors.

Prospects for Cooperation With U.S. in Defense Conversion

94WC0011A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 46,
10-16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 9 Nov 93) p 5

[Article by Professor Yuriy Davydov: "A Pump Working in the Other Direction"]

[Text] **It's no secret to anyone that the Russian military-industrial complex is living through its worst crisis. The official diagnosis reveals objective difficulties in the conversion process and in transition to a market economy. An integral concept of conversion is lacking, as a result of which an elephant often gives birth to a mouse: An enterprise that used to produce uranium now makes toothpaste tubes or juicers, senselessly squandering its**

industrial and professional potential. And there is something else that is having its effect: The former military-industrial complex was in its very essence an absolutely anti-market organization.

First of all, there was never any need to reckon with the costs of scientific research, experimental design work and production: It received from the country whatever assets and resources it wished. In a number of ways it attained accomplishments at the world level or even higher, but the society has no idea of the price by which they were attained.

Second, competition had little relevance to the military-industrial complex, and the concept of marketing was totally alien to it: It worked on state orders, and in the international arena it serviced the Soviet Union's ideological clients, who paid not with money but with political loyalty. Now that it has attempted to enter the world arms market on its own, its share of world arms trade has immediately dropped from 38 to 18 percent. Of course, a romantic vision of the outside world by the new Russian leadership, which apparently believed that Russia's democratization would make it exempt from competition, also played its role.

The psychology of dependence traditionally inherent to the military-industrial complex is also suffocating the current Russian approach to conversion. It had always held a privileged position in the Soviet economy, and its lobby was the most influential within it. The situation both in defense production and in the armament structure of the Army itself, and not the suitability of reasonable sufficiency, predetermined the specific needs of the military-industrial complex. This is probably the only explanation for the fact that a poor country, and one with centralized planning at that, was able to allow itself the luxury of possessing eight different types of land-based strategic missiles with nuclear warheads (for comparison, the United States had only three types), and five types of ballistic missiles for submarines (the USA had two modifications). The wall of secrecy fencing off military industry from its civilian counterpart blocked the transfer of accomplishments in scientific research, experimental design work and production processes from the military-industrial complex to nonmilitary spheres of production. (Western firms usually combine both kinds of production). For practical purposes, the military-industrial complex was not only a state within a state, but also a powerful pump sucking the best personnel, resources and equipment out of the economy, while giving it nothing in return.

And although Russia is living today in a different dimension, the nostalgia of a number of generals of the military-industrial complex for the good old days is having its impact. The attempted reprisals against two chemical scientists—V. Mirzoyanov and L. Fedorov, who announced that rather than carrying out conversion they

were being required to continue work on chemical weapons—reveal the possibilities of Russia's defense establishment. It would probably be unfair to lump all representatives of the present military-industrial complex into this category—there are many among them who are striving for real conversion, for the output of science-intensive products, and not aluminum frying pans. They are justified in their desire to not go from one extreme to the other, to use production to create a sound financial base for conversion.

But another trend exists as well. Striving to preserve their function, their corporate nature and their privileged position in the country's economy, some circles in the military-industrial complex are attempting to achieve mutual understanding, to organize interaction with analogous military-industrial complexes abroad. The most powerful of them is in the United States, which is also experiencing difficulties and a drop in prestige brought about by the sudden disappearance of bipolar confrontation. Consequently, it is natural that in its search for a partner the Russian military-industrial complex would want to achieve mutual understanding primarily with the American one (though this does not exclude the others).

Such cooperation has already progressed beyond good intentions. For example American scientists working in the Livermore Laboratory on a roentgen laser under the SDI program encountered fundamental difficulties that they were unable to resolve on their own. According to their information, Russian researchers working on a similar problem were around 15 years ahead of the them. And so President G. Bush personally asked B. Yeltsin to allow American experts to visit the Russian center, which had enjoyed success in this direction. And consent was given. Moreover Russia sent a group of scientists to Livermore to help the Americans solve many problems. Here's another example: For just \$12 million the United States purchased one of the most outstanding accomplishments of the Russian military-industrial complex—the Topaz-2 nuclear reactor, which the Americans plan to use in that same Star Wars program. Russian engineers traveled to the USA to participate in the work to put the reactor on line. In the opinion of American experts, the reactor's acquisition saved several years of work and billions of dollars. In the meantime, they paid the Russian engineers who set it up for them on the basis of Soviet standards—\$20-\$30 per month, which is 200 times less than what their American colleagues get.

Something else is typical as well: When Russia raised the question of creating a joint antimissile defense system, Washington's response was cold. During preparations for the Vancouver summit a certain member of the Russian ruling elite suggested to Yeltsin that he discuss with Clinton the question of joint work on plasma weapons to be used against ballistic missiles—a doubtful idea in the opinion of a number of authorities. Luckily, the discussion never took place, but the military-industrial complex continues to search for foreign niches.

Of course, not everything is positive about the desire to establish international cooperation among national military-industrial complexes. It is one thing when the discussion turns to equipping the Russian IL-96M passenger aircraft with more powerful and economical engines from America's Pratt and Whitney. But military space programs are something else: To what extent can they promote conversion of Russia's military industry, how much can they do to lift up a country that is unable to feed its own people? Many questions still remain open.

Principal among them are apparently the following, if we disregard the moral and ethical side of the matter (mutual understanding between national military-industrial complexes always provokes anxiety): Is this cooperation developing in the interests of conversion of military industry, or its preservation? This question is relevant by the way not just to the Russian military-industrial complex, but also to foreign ones. The transfer of purely military technology is proceeding today in a single direction—to the USA (from which only the technology of destroying weapons is flowing). Doesn't this create a situation where Russia's military-industrial complex is more interested in pumping its know-how not into its civilian industry but chiefly into Western military-industrial complexes? Are dollars presently more attractive than rubles?

The West, which fears a "brain drain" from the Russian military-industrial complex into countries unfriendly to it, would apparently not be above diverting this flow to itself. But what Russia fears is the "brain drain" occurring out of its conversion program, and in this latter case it may be even more intensive than in the former.

The Russian military-industrial complex does not have any experience in commercial transactions and business cooperation, and its knowledge of the market is poor; nonetheless it wants to penetrate into it at any price. But any price means the lowest price. We are forced to consider that some deals between the Russian military-industrial complex and the USA are already evoking alarm among local businesses that are losing their share of profitable orders. The motives sound familiar: Russia is costing Americans their jobs. Finally, the equality and promise of this cooperation remain unclear. It may be that such apprehensions are exaggerated today. The scale of present cooperation of the Russian military-industrial complex with analogous structures abroad is still too modest to affect conversion negatively. But it is important to know where a road leads before you set off on it.

Russia-U.S. To Cooperate on Alfa Space Project

*LD1611175293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1446 GMT 16 Nov 93*

[Text] Russia and the United States are to reorientate their national programs for manned flights and new generation orbiting stations by focusing on a joint Alfa project. The two sides meeting in Washington early this month reached agreement to set up an international

space complex which will be participated in by Canada, Japan and the European Space Agency.

This will bind Russia and the United States to abandon their Mir-2 and Freedom projects respectively, General Director of the Russian Space Agency Yuriy Koptev told a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday.

Forty percent of space missions by U.S. shuttle spacecraft will be carried out in the interests of the Alfa project during the first stage covering the period of 1995-1997. The Russian program for manned space flights is also to be aimed towards the creation of a new orbiting station. More robust solar batteries are to be delivered to the orbiting Mir station by U.S. shuttle spacecraft to prolong the station's life and ensure normal functioning of its new two modules.

Russia and the United States are expected to sign a final agreement on Moscow's participation in the Alfa project as U.S. Vice President Albert Gore arrives for a two-day visit in Moscow on December 16. Koptev said the two countries would also strike a \$350-370 Mn deal to pay for Russia's services in the initial stage.

He said the detailed plan for an international space station was now being considered by U.S. congress which is expected to pass a resolution before Gore's visit to Moscow.

Until then, Russia is expected to receive an invitation from the Canadian, European and Japanese space agencies as three other parties to the project having bilateral agreements with the U.S. government.

Talks Open With Belarus on Nuclear Strike Warning Systems

*LD1811093093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 18 Nov 93*

[Text] The third round of talks between Russia and Belarus on nuclear strike early warning systems opens at the Russian Defense Ministry's directorate for external relations today. Russian and Belarussian military specialists think that the necessity of preserving, developing, and improving such systems represents a strategically important factor of world stability. A package of measures to ensure their controllability and combat readiness will be discussed at the meeting.

Mikhaylov Criticizes HEU Reprocessing Agreement

*94WC0008A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 40, 01 Oct 93 p 7*

[Article by Mikhail Klasson: "The Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering Is Surprised by Americans' Inconsistency"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] A Russian-American memorandum on transparency of operations with uranium has been signed in Washington, but an executive contract hasn't been concluded.

Under the inter-government agreement signed by Russia and the USA in February 1993 concerning the use for peaceful purposes of highly enriched weapon uranium the sides were to draft and conclude within half a year two more documents: a memorandum on the transparency of operations with uranium and an executive contract.

The purpose of the memorandum is to ensure control by American specialists at Russian plants where weapon uranium (90% U235 and higher) will be "diluted" to the concentration 4.4% U235 necessary for making fuel rods for atomic power stations.

The control should guarantee that uranium is "diluted" from dismantled nuclear weapons and that it is not used once again for military purposes. At the same time Russian specialists will go to the United States to make sure that lowly enriched uranium goes to civilian consumers and not to plants for enriching uranium for making nuclear weapons.

Russia and the USA were also to draft and sign in Washington an executive contract that would determine concrete dates, volumes of deliveries and prices of uranium. The basic parameters of the contract—the total cost of 11.9 billion dollars and the time of deliveries of 20 years—were already agreed during the Vancouver meeting of the Russian and US presidents. If the contract is fulfilled, at least 500 tons of weapon uranium will go across the ocean.

It has been agreed that all operations necessary for bringing the concentration of U235 to 4.4% will be carried out at Russian plants. Here it will first of all be freed from additives which were necessary in nuclear warheads. Secondly the "dilution" of weapon uranium will be done by low-concentration uranium in a gaseous phase. This variant is, in the opinion of Russian specialists, economically more effective compared with the "dilution" with natural uranium.

The sides earlier agreed on the price of 780 dollars a kilogram (the world price vacillates from 600 to 800 dollars a kilogram). Thus, Viktor Mikhailov, Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering of the Russian Federation, believes that all basic provisions of the contract have been agreed upon in six months and it remained at the talks in Washington to specify certain minor nuances of legal and technical nature.

But the State Department and the White House suddenly advanced a new condition. They think that Russia should give the Americans guarantees that the proceeds from the deal will be justly distributed between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Viktor Mikhailov stated in an exclusive interview he gave to a correspondent of Business MN that this demand is purely political and has no relation to the February agreement concluded between the two sides, Russia and the USA. Nor does Russia need any intermediaries in its negotiations with CIS countries.

Since the six-month period has expired, the Americans have violated, Viktor Mikhailov says, the agreement they signed. But the minister hopes nevertheless that the contract will be concluded in October of this year.

Russia needs the deal because it can yield hard currency for the conduct of conversion, enhancing the safety of atomic power stations, improving the ecological situation and the support of basic research. On the other hand, the Russian minister believes, the Americans are no less interested in the implementation of the contract because their diffusion technologies for the mining and enrichment of uranium hopelessly lag behind Russian technologies. In order to introduce modern technologies, the Americans will have to stop their plants, which may disrupt earlier concluded contracts for the delivery of low-concentration uranium to atomic power stations in other countries. The volume of these contracts amounts to about one half of the entire world uranium market. In the opinion of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering uranium from Russian warheads could follow the line of American deliveries without crossing direct export from Russia.

Viktor Mikhailov noted in connection with the problem of exporting and processing uranium from Ukraine's nuclear warheads that, according to the agreement on "zero option" signed in the Crimea, Russia will make from this uranium fuel assemblies for Ukrainian atomic power stations and sell part of it to the USA to cover the expenses involved (on approximately 50-50 basis). Thus, Viktor Mikhailov believes, the political problem which the Americans created for themselves when they hastened to recognize Ukraine without denuding that it should formalize its status as a nuclear-free power and give guarantees of signing the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has already been solved.

Fulfillment of CFE Treaty Hampered by Poor Material Base

LD1711213293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Video report by correspondent Aleksandr Ostrovskiy; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Ostrovskiy] The first stage of the Treaty on Reductions in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] has been completed. In the center of Europe there has been a sharp drop in the concentration of troops and armaments. The geography of deployment has also changed. Now 36 countries are participating in the process of disarmament.

[V. Leshchenko, head of the Center for the Implementation of the Ground Troops Treaty] Altogether 31 inspections have been carried out at the locations where ground troops are being reduced. To date, inspection groups from Great Britain, Norway, the FRG, and Canada are working at locations in our country where reductions are planned. [Ostrovskiy] Russia is to scrap almost 12,000 units of armaments and equipment, and in the past year some 4,000 old fighting vehicles were destroyed. But, because of a poor material base, it is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill the reductions treaty, given the fact that dismantling one tank now costs almost 1 million rubles. Dreams that enterprises destroying combat equipment and armaments would pay for themselves have proved to be Utopian.

Goods Destroyed Under CFE Mysteriously Missing

PM221141593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Yuriy Kovalenko report: "NATO Interested in 'Disappearance' of 2,000 Units of Combat Equipment on Territory of Former USSR"]

[Text] Paris—Around 2,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, which were to be destroyed in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE], have mysteriously "disappeared" in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union. This has been stated in Brussels by a NATO spokesman, who wishes to remain anonymous.

It is unclear what has nevertheless happened to all this combat equipment, the high-ranking NATO spokesman said. However, the West is demanding explanations from Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. The confusion emerged, it is being noted within the North Atlantic alliance, after these republics agreed to take upon themselves the reduction of conventional weapons in accordance with the treaty signed by the USSR.

For example, it is being noted in NATO headquarters, Azerbaijan, which is continuing its war with Armenia, does not know exactly what number of weapons it has at its disposal. And Russia still has 25-30 tanks which it should eliminate by the end of November 1993.

Finally, NATO has reacted adversely to Moscow's request that certain amendments be made to the CFE Treaty to enable Russia to increase the quantity of combat equipment in the Caucasus, where the armed conflicts are persisting, AP reports.

Despite the individual hitches, NATO believes, the reduction of conventional weapons is proceeding in line with the schedule defined by the treaty, which entered into force in November of last year. NATO member states and member states of the now dissolved Warsaw Pact have already destroyed over 15,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces.

In line with the treaty, which was signed by 29 states which at one time belonged to the hostile blocs, the countries of the former socialist camp must destroy in all some 35,000 units of weapons of this kind, while their NATO colleagues must destroy 16,000. When this elimination ends in 1995, the NATO and ex-Warsaw Pact states will retain 20,000 tanks each on European territory from the Atlantic to the Urals.

CW Convention Said To Allow 'Nonlethal' CW Development

94WC0013A Moscow MEZHODUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 9, Sep 93 (Signed to press 01 Sep 93)
pp 81-86

[Article by N. Antonov (Nikolai Serafimovich Antonov - Doctor of Technical Sciences, Chemical and Biological Weapons Protection Expert): "Post-Convention Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] In January this year in a ceremonial setting, a convention on prohibiting the design, production and use of chemical weapons, as well as destroying existing stores was opened for signing in Paris. Today this convention has been signed by plenipotentiaries from more than 130 states. As of yet the convention has not yet been signed by Iraq, Libya, and several other states. The chemical convention is expected to become effective at the beginning of 1995.

State-parties to the chemical convention have on a voluntary basis obligated themselves to abstain from:

- a) developing, producing, acquiring by other means, stockpiling, or storing chemical weapons; or transferring them either directly or indirectly to any party whatsoever;
- b) using chemical weapons or conducting preparations for their use;
- c) aiding, encouraging, or inciting other states to conduct any type of activity prohibited for state-parties to the convention.

In the context of the convention chemical weapons are implied as ammunition and devices, which when used release toxic agents that inflict fatal injury, temporarily incapacitate, or maim enemy military personnel, in addition to population and animals. Herbicides, defoliants and irritants designated for police use do not fall under the 1993 chemical convention ban, although the stipulation is made that state-parties are obligated to abstain from their use as a means of waging war.

The convention obligates its participants to destroy the following within 10 years of the ban's date of effectiveness:

- a) all stores of chemical weapons in their possession, to include those located on the territory of another state-party to the convention;

b) all enterprises involved in the manufacture of chemical weaponry at a volume of more than one tonne of toxic agent per year.

The 1993 Chemical Convention does not replace the 1925 Geneva Protocol, in accordance with which the use of chemical weaponry and biological agents-pathogens as a means of conducting war is prohibited. If for some reason a state withdraws from the 1993 Chemical Convention, that state still maintains its obligations in accordance with the Geneva Protocol.

Many states which signed the Geneva Protocol, to include the former Soviet Union, reserved the right to launch a response strike using chemical weapons against an aggressor first utilizing toxic agents. In becoming a state-party to the 1993 Chemical Convention, these countries renounce the right to any response action using toxic agents.

Unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the biological convention of 1972, the chemical convention has clear provisions on the international verification procedure for monitoring state-party observation of the obligations voluntarily assumed. In accordance with the convention, an organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons is being founded in order to realize the aim and purpose of the convention, and to ensure the genuine implementation of its provisions. Within the makeup of the organization's bodies a conference of state-parties was instituted, as was an executive council and technical secretariat, with the functions and powers of the latter also being defined.

A virtue of the 1993 convention is its enumeration of various types of activities involving chemical weapons that are not prohibited. They include:

- a) work conducted for technological, agricultural, research, medical, pharmacological or other peaceful purposes;
- b) work directly related to protection from toxic chemicals and chemical weapons;
- c) the design and use of chemical means for riot control;
- d) work carried out for military objectives, though not related to the use of chemical weapons and not realizing the harmful properties of chemical agents as a result of the latter's toxic action.

With the end of the "Cold War" and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the bipolar world ceased to exist. However, this generally positive situation has led to further destabilization. Armed conflicts in various corners of the world have become more frequent. In addition to the traditional hot spots in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa there are now armed conflicts between nations in the territories formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More and more often these local armed conflicts are drawing in the armed forces of the world's prominent states.

The development of the military means being used in these conflicts, however, was based on the concept of waging global wars. Allowances were made for the total destruction of enemy military and industrial installations, while hardly any consideration was given to losses among the civilian population. Peacekeeping operations conducted by groups of allied troops, carried out in accordance with UN Security Council decisions, prompted a search for alternate methods of conducting military actions. The objective of the latter was to employ a different weapons system, an alternative means of waging conventional and nuclear war. On these grounds the concept of "nonlethal weaponry" appeared, within the framework of which the use of certain chemical agents is being examined from a non-traditional view.

According to a publication in the journal *INSIDE THE ARMY*, the American Training and Doctrine Command, in its concept paper "Air-Land Operation" (1 Aug 91), defines "nonlethal technology" as "technology, with potential for development into weaponry that can disable or destroy an enemy's capability without causing significant injury, excessive property destruction or widespread environmental damage."

The magazine *NATIONAL JOURNAL*, dated March 28, 1992, gives examples of "nonlethal weaponry" as "low-powered (low-energy) lasers to temporarily blind people, infrasound waves to temporarily disorient and incapacitate people, and chemical agents that would change the molecular structure of base metals or alloys on critical aircraft, ships, trucks or armored vehicles." In addition, the report also lists chemical immobilizers, non-nuclear electromagnetic waves [microwave generators] and relaxants for use in rendering electronic systems inoperable, destroying the enemy's capability to conduct offense operations, and selectively destroying strategic targets.

In the U.S. the development of a new strategy, which provides for the use of "nonlethal weapons," is being coordinated by official representatives of the National Security Council. Participants in the research and development include agencies, directorates, administrations and staff of the Department of Defense. The highly reputed Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories are actively involved in research on this problem. In congress budgetary appropriations are being considered for conducting preliminary technological design work. It is thought that the implementation of the planned projects and programs will ensure U.S. leadership in the realm of "nonlethal technology," and will increase opportunities and strengthen the position of the U.S. in the world that has taken shape following the end of the "Cold War."

Chemical weaponry was initially created and developed on the basis of employing its toxic effects on people and animals. Now the objectives achieved with the aid of chemical agents have been considerably broadened. The effects are targeted not only at the people that make up

crews and detachments, but at means of warfare and troop command and control systems as well.

Chemical means for destroying vegetation can also be classified as a nonlethal type of weaponry. The use of herbicides and defoliants during the war in South Vietnam was not purposefully directed against people. The task of destroying grain and industrial crops, sugar cane and forest which served the Vietnamese as a place for cover and habitation, was achieved with the aid of these chemicals. The end goal of using these agents was to break down the enemy's resistance.

Herbicides, defoliants and other means having harmful effects on the environment **do not fall under the ban** imposed by the 1993 chemical convention. This decision is not undisputed, however, due to the sharp increase in their destructive properties of the latter. During the Vietnam War a mixture dose rate of 10 kilograms of herbicide per hectare was required to destroy food crops, while only .005 kilograms is sufficient for accomplishing the same task today with the aid of modern herbicides. Sulfometuronmethyl, produced by the Dupont firm, will destroy agricultural crops at a dose rate of .004 to .48 kilograms per hectare, and when the dose rate is doubled it also destroys wood and shrub vegetation. The herbicide methylsulfuronmethyl, produced by the same firm, will destroy grass, wood and shrub vegetation at even lower dose rates. There are also well-known, highly-effective herbicides among other classes of chemical compounds which do not fall under the convention ban. Thus, the consequences of similar herbicides being used during a wartime situation are not difficult to imagine.

In handling animals, and particularly when apprehending them in the wild, it is known that chemical agents generally termed as "immobilizers" are used. The latter render the animals incapable of moving following a corresponding injection with a syringe or special round. In connection with this it is appropriate to recall publications printed during the 50's concerning an accidental poisoning incident, which resulted from the use of a chemical agent for improving plasticity in synthetic film materials. Olive oil for consumption was poured into packaging not entirely free of this peptizing agent, which, as it turned out, possessed the properties of an immobilizer. The oil was then delivered in the packaging to positions occupied by the Algerians during the armed conflict with France. The use of the delivered oil in their food rendered the Algerians incapable of moving, and their subdivision was captured, so to speak, bare-handed by the French, who were not expecting this effect.

At the present time the development of immobilizers is being conducted openly. The strongest analgesics and anesthetics are being considered as prospects. Karfentanyl and several of its derivatives are comparable at certain dosages to toxic agents having a nervous-paralytic effect. During wartime immobilizers could be delivered in an aerosol form (smoke), which when inhaled would render people immobile. At the same time, however, the text of the chemical convention does

not give a clear answer as to whether the use of immobilizers as chemical weapons is prohibited.

Fully included under the heading of "nonlethal weapons," are chemical agents, with the help of which one can render motorized equipment inoperable: tanks, armored personnel carriers, and vehicles. The combustion of fuel in the engine's cylinders is none other than a chain reaction between hydrocarbons and oxygen in the air. Like all chemical reactions it can be stopped or slowed when reaction inhibitors, sprayed on vehicle movement routes, get into the fuel-air mixture. It is also possible to introduce specially designed agents into the atmosphere which cause fuel and lubricants to thicken, consequently disrupting the normal operation of the engine.

The creation of agents that can either cause intense corrosion on account of combustion products, or destroy materials in engine pistons and bushings, is also not being ruled out.

According to a published patent, foam roadblocks could be created along routes of military movement. The foam material could contain agents that, upon entry into the air-intake passageway, would be capable of stopping engines. Special adhesive components could also be put into a foam to render vehicle moving parts inoperable. For enemy air defense, another patent proposes to create an aerosol cloud of agents capable of polymerizing. Landing in the heated turbines of the aircraft engines, these agents will adhere to the blades of the turbocompressor and stop the engine.

In several American journals so-called friction inhibitors are mentioned, which are capable of sharply decreasing traction along various surfaces. If rail lines are covered with these compounds on inclines and downgrades, trains will either stop due to the loss of traction by the locomotive, or will lose breaking capability altogether, with obvious consequences. By analogy, it is assumed that a similar effect could be achieved by treating hardtop vehicle roadways with friction inhibitors.

There are known agents capable of interacting with the surfaces of silicate glass, thereby destroying its transparency. If this effect could be successfully intensified, it would be possible to use such compounds on a mass scale to render optical devices and sight glass inoperable; a measure that could be warranted in the aim of blinding military vehicles.

The use of certain agents that are still in the hypothetical stages pose a particular danger. The latter include components that, when applied to the surfaces of dielectric synthetic materials, transform the surfaces into conducting fields. The consequences are not difficult to imagine. The resultant electrical shorting could render radar and radio communications systems inoperable, as well as on-board electronic steering and guidance systems.

The examples given here far from exhaust the list of ways that there are to create and use "nonlethal chemical weapons."

Modern aircraft carriers, operating together with security vessels are virtually invulnerable to ballistic missiles, guided cruise missiles, bomb and missile strikes by aircraft, and torpedo attacks by submarine. Aircraft carriers are also invulnerable to attacks that employ chemical weapons from the existing arsenal, as the carriers have a reliable system of corresponding defense. However, the latter are hardly equipped to protect themselves from "nonlethal" chemical weapons.

A heavy aerosol-droplet cloud, formed out of range of on-board air defense systems, could be directed at an aircraft carrier. To implement this idea corresponding chemical agents would be needed, as would military transport aircraft adapted for dispersing large quantities of chemicals. According to wind profile measurements at several points (speeds and directions at various altitudes) it would be possible using a mathematic modeling method to forecast the wind pattern for the entire zone of water being monitored. The geographic coordinates and altitude of the flight paths for spreading the chemical agent could then be calculated, guaranteeing the destination of the aerosol-droplet cloud within the aircraft carrier's region of activity. Once formed, the movement of the aerosol-droplet cloud would be practically impossible to stop.

Depending on the properties of the chemical agent used, the assaulted aircraft carrier could possibly lose its steering, guidance, and navigation capabilities. Carrier aircraft could not take off, and deck and superstructure surfaces could lose their traction, preventing crew and pilots from moving about the vessel freely.

The reader will have no difficulty in finding an element of fantasy in the text of this article. However, one must consider why the U.S. Congress is planning to appropriate 148 million dollars for such "fantasy," and why large scientific bodies have been brought in to work on the problem of "nonlethal" weapons.

The process of chemical disarmament did not end with the signing of the 1993 convention. The convention does not prohibit the use of "nonlethal" chemical weapons, yet the work that has begun will sooner or later lead to some result. It is clear that whatever the type of "nonlethal" chemical weapon, it will not fail to raise fears about the future. The fact that its components may not produce harsh toxic effects does not mean that it is harmless to people and the environment. These agents, in accordance with their intended use, cannot be chemically inert.

Until the middle of the 20th Century the relationship between weapons and ecology did not attract particular attention. However, each weapon, when used on a mass scale, has a harmful impact on the environment. This was particularly apparent as a result of military action in South Vietnam, during the course of which chemical

means of destruction were used continuously for 10 years. Under contemporary conditions, military doctrine cannot allow the arbitrary selection of means for conducting war.

Mankind's shared interest in preserving the environment and the health of the earth's inhabitants places stringent requirements on the forms and systems of weapons in existing armaments, as well as those intended for future development. Every type of weapon is international in the sense that sooner or later it may be acquired by many countries.

The majority of states in the world actively cooperate with UNEP [United Nations Environment Program] on environmental preservation issues. The latter is an expert international organization that coordinates policy in the realm of ecology. In connection with this, **raising the question of establishing general principles and approaches to various systems of weaponry in terms of their ecological risk is fully in order.** Failure to observe these generally recognized requirements would subject existing armament or newly developed systems of weaponry to an unconditional ban. In any case, whatever the requirements, "nonlethal" chemical weapons will hardly comply with the most basic norms for preserving the environment. Thus, it would be wise to pose the question of whether it is in the interest of mankind's survival to prohibit "nonlethal" weapons before they become a part of arsenals.

History bears testimony to the fact that it is not rare for projects that do not initially seem feasible, to be translated into real forms of military technology and armament. Unfortunately, the very creators of the newest means for conducting armed battle do not always take into consideration the possible negative consequences of using the results of their labor in respect to the future of mankind. If only the incident with Nobel Laureate Fritz Haber would never repeat itself. Haber proposed and carried out the mass use of toxic agents in 1915. He hardly imaged the scale of military, political, economic, ecological, and social consequences for all of mankind that the creation, production, use, and even destruction of stores of modern chemical weapons would have.

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Aleksey Arbatov on NATO Expansion, CFE Impact

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[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Geopolitical and Military Forecast Center: "The West Will Not Defend Russia Against the West: The Countries of Eastern Europe Are Striving To Join NATO. Why? Against Whom?"]

[Text] President Yeltsin's consent to Poland's membership of NATO, which astonished everyone in August,

and then his message to a number of Western leaders of directly opposite import—this was not simply another diplomatic oddity testifying to confusion in Russia's foreign policy departments. While in no way excusing such diplomatic style, it needs to be observed that the rearrangement of the European political arena in the aftermath of the Cold War remains an extremely contradictory matter. It is causing confusion in the minds of specialists and politicians not only in Russia but in other countries also.

New relations are taking shape spontaneously under the influence of multi-directional national interests and concerns. The most profound changes in military-strategic realities on the continent are affording extensive scope for the constructive establishment of states' new relations in the security sphere. At the same time, however, a number of countries could take unguarded steps which deform or even block the formation of a new system of collective security for a long time.

How Much Has Russia Been Weakened?

Europe's new military-political realities are so commonly known that we may confine ourselves to a simple enumeration of them: The unification of Germany; the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; the failure of "real socialism" in East Europe, Russia, and other post-Soviet republics; the political instability accompanying these changes and economic crises.

As a consequence, there is a reduction in the possibility of war between powers which were opposed in the past and, together with this, instability and an increase in armed conflicts in East Europe and the former USSR. The fundamental changes in the military-strategic balance under the influence of the said factors and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and military reform in many countries, including Russia and NATO, envisage deep cuts in the armies and their massive pullback from overseas, the winding down of arms programs, and the reorientation of forces toward other assignments.

The CFE Treaty of November 1990 established equality in offensive conventional arms¹ at lower levels between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. But the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and the abolition of the USSR shortly after broke up this orderly disarmament design. Countries' national quotas then had to be agreed on inasmuch as they had in the East ceased to be allies. And subsequently, in accordance with an agreement in Tashkent in May 1992, the combat hardware of the Soviet Union and the negotiated authorization for its reduction were shared between Russia and the other former Soviet republics.

Geostrategically, all this entailed two changes of enormous significance. The first consists of a radical change in the balance of forces on the continent.

We shall adduce just the main indicators of this change. At the end of 1988, when Mikhail Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction in Soviet forces and arms, the ratio of Warsaw Pact-NATO forces in terms of the principal types of combat hardware (which were subsequently encompassed by the treaty) constituted 2.7:1. In Europe the Soviet Union alone had twofold (!) superiority to all 16 NATO countries put together.

Following execution of the CFE Treaty, in the latter half of the 1990's, the balance will be the opposite, and the ratio of forces between Russia and NATO will be 1:2.8 in favor of the West. If, on the other hand, the former Soviet Warsaw Pact allies are added to NATO, the balance will be 1:3.7. If, however, for strategic extrapolation purposes, the forces of former Soviet republics in the European zone which are now independent states are added to the West, the ratio becomes 1:4.5 to Russia's disadvantage.

So the military balance in Europe has in just a few years changed for Moscow from its almost threefold superiority to its virtually fivefold lag. The scale itself and the speed of this change and the unwonted nature of the new situation cannot fail to give rise to acute concern in the military, whatever reassuring arguments it may adduce. Whence the natural reaction—concentrating as many forces as possible in the European part of Russia and using the existence of nuclear weapons as means of deterrence, having abandoned, in particular, even the USSR's purely declarative 1981 undertaking on no first use.

Strong as Before

What lies on the surface, for that matter, is not always true and, more often than not, simply wrong. Let us take a look at the situation from the other side and only from a pragmatic military-political angle, without resorting to loaded propositions of the "new political thinking," which set the teeth on edge.

Without any treaty Russia would hardly be stronger by the end of the 1990's on account of economic factors and the disintegration of military-industrial cooperation with other republics and in connection with the military reform. For example, in 1988 the USSR had ground forces numbering 1.6 million persons, who were armed with approximately 60,000 tanks with an annual manufacture thereof of up to 3,500. As of the mid-1990's, according to the plans of military reform of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the entire Russian Army will constitute 1.5 million men, of which the ground forces will account for a maximum of 600,000-700,000 men or even fewer.

With the creation of a professional army the need for enormous stocks of arms and equipment as part of divisions geared to the mobilization of millions of reservists in the event of war will disappear. The emphasis on lighter mobile forces for rapid deployment in local conflicts will reduce the need for heavy combat

equipment. According to the most approximate calculations, the Russian Army will need no more than 10,000-15,000 tanks, mainly for defense of the southern and eastern borders. Some 6,000-7,000 tanks will remain in the European zone; that is, approximately as many as authorized in accordance with the treaty.

If matters are approached from the other side, the production of tanks compared with 1988 has now declined fivefold, to 500-700 a year. Previously the giant tank fleet was replaced, even with that scale of production, every 20 years, on account of which a large part consisted of obsolete and obsolescent equipment. The new professional army of Russia must be furnished with the latest equipment, which the military understands as replacement of the tank fleet every 10-15 years. Even with the maintenance of present production and the use of the permitted warehoused reserves we once again arrive at overall numbers of approximately 10,000-15,000 tanks. The situation is similar with other types of combat hardware.

Despite all the changes in the military balance of recent years, Russia remains the strongest military power in Europe and one of the strongest states in the world in terms of this parameter. Let us even leave aside nuclear weapons, of which Russia will in 10 years' time, granted realization of the START II Treaty, have preserved approximate equivalence with the United States at the 3,000-3,500 warhead level and five to sevenfold superiority to any other nuclear power. Aside from this, in terms of the main categories of conventional forces, Russia will be superior to Germany by a factor of 2.4; France, by a factor of 3.7; Britain, by a factor of 5.4; and to the American forces on the continent, more than twofold.

There is no doubt that the state of the Russian Army is currently extremely grave. The already low army morale due to the difficult living conditions is sustaining additional damage as a result of the Army's involvement in ethnic conflicts. The use of the Army for purposes that are not part of its functions at the time of the October events in Moscow inflicted new moral damage.

All this is true, but these are predominantly self-induced problems, the result of miscalculations and the loss of control in Gaidarnomics, the democratic political transformations, the conversion of defense industry, military reform, and the organization of the new commonwealth of states in place of the collapsed USSR. They are the consequences of an inability not only to foresee but also to adapt in time to the social, geopolitical, and geostrategic changes.

The fundamental shifts in the military balance, as well as the arms reduction treaties, have nothing to do with it. Had Russia five times more forces and weapons, the situation would be no easier. Rather, the reverse is true; the current problems would be exacerbated such that the economy, the state, and the army would fall apart completely.

Is Moscow Not Behind Us?

Moscow's military power has today retreated 1,500 km from the center of Europe, from Magdeburg and Prague to Smolensk and Kursk. For 45 years Soviet tank assault armies were within a two-week dash to the Channel, and air and missile forces with nuclear and conventional weapons could have incinerated all of Europe west of the Elbe in a matter of hours. And backing the forward armies were a further three attack echelons in East Europe and western districts of the USSR.

For the first time in 300 years (in peace time) the Moscow Military District has changed from being the deep rear to the forward edge of Russia's defenses. It is not surprising that among the military this fact evokes a keen sense of vulnerability: Having become accustomed to living under strong armor, it is uncomfortable to find oneself out in the open. That the Europeans were for decades in a far more vulnerable position—this was their problem, not ours. At the same time, on the other hand, Russia has a decided advantage over the Europe of the postwar years. For the first time in many centuries of its history Russia is not threatened by any attack from outside. And this, generally speaking, is a unique instance in the history of the downfall of empires.

The administrative-industrial heart of Russia is now beyond the reach even of the modern tactical attack aircraft of the biggest military powers west, south, and east. The 1,500 km corridor beyond which the Russian Armed Forces have pulled back from the center of Europe keeps the West's aviation beyond effective range and pulls Russian troops out of jeopardy. This, of course, on condition that the military bases of the United States and its allies are not moved eastward.

So, there are undoubtedly radical strategic changes to Moscow's disadvantage both in terms of the correlation of forces and in the geographical aspect. But these changes are basically of an objective and inevitable nature. And if we stop bemoaning a superiority which has gone irretrievably and take a fresh look at the realities, they contain positive aspects. The possibility of increasing the effect of the propitious aspects of the new realities will largely depend on Russia's policy. The objective changes dictate specific imperatives for a Russian national security concept and policy.

Four Imperatives

The first is that the realization of the CFE Treaty (as also of START I and START II and other disarmament agreements), corresponds, on the whole, to Russia's interests. Individual shortcomings of the treaties are repaid with interest not solely by their political significance. Without the treaties, by virtue of economic and many other reasons, Russia would hardly be capable of having appreciably greater military power in the foreseeable future. Yet the other powers, given sufficient political motives, were perfectly capable of a sharp buildup of forces and the winning of undisputed superiority—from

the viewpoint of their economic, technical, and demographic potential, the advantageousness of geostrategic location, and the possibility of interaction.

It is extremely short-sighted for Moscow to present ultimatum and threaten to pull out of the treaties, even if they are unsuitable in some respects. That a rapidly changing situation frequently entails the obsolescence of this clause of an agreement or the other is another matter.⁷ For that matter, it still needs to be sorted out if the problems are that great and if there are no other ways of resolving them. But the main thing is that, given favorable political conditions, it is possible to go further and put into practice subsequent agreements with regard for new problems of security and the possibilities of their solution: provided that there are new ideas and that the administrative machinery can implement them. This is the second imperative.

The third imperative is conditioned by aspects of the changed strategic balance. Russia remains militarily a leading power of Europe and the world and can count on respect and security—this is determined by the numbers of the forces and arms. But as a state opposed to NATO, especially a NATO together with the East European countries and with the association of the Western republics of the former USSR, Russia has no chance.

The hopes that nuclear weapons and a revival of the principle of their first use would be a panacea against all troubles are illusory here. We are not talking about an actual big war, in which the use of nuclear weapons on both sides is unavoidable. We are talking about a resumption of the Cold War with its military-political pressure, the exhaustion of the enemy in local conflicts, economic blockade, suffocation in geopolitical isolation. Nuclear weapons are no argument here. Both sides have more than enough for neutralizing any bluff or blackmail. The Soviet Union could not sustain such a "package." Gorbachev began to extricate himself from it thanks to "new political thinking," and the internal processes which it spurred brought down the communist empire completely.

Even less could postcommunist Russia sustain this. Nor does it need to. Preventing the revival of an enlarged anti-Moscow coalition of states will depend on Russia itself, in the main. Democratic transformations within, good-neighbor relations with near and distant foreign countries (which is by no means the equivalent of being led around by the United States on all matters), reining in its own neoimperial propensities, high-minded defense of clearly and rationally formulated national interests—this is all that is required of Russia.

The fourth imperative. The retreat of Russia's military power from the center of Europe has entailed for Moscow not only unaccustomed weaknesses but also unprecedented advantages in the sense of the distant disengagement from the forces of the major military powers of the West. Firmly establishing this disengagement is a most important task of security strategy.

It is primarily a question of the assurance of the neutral and nuclear-free status and independence and security of the dual belt of states of East Europe and the western republics of the former USSR as a pillar of the new system of European security. For many centuries these countries were a springboard sometimes for the West's aggression against Russia, sometimes for the other way about. Henceforward West Europe, the United States, and Russia should be guarantors of these countries' neutrality and security and should convert them into a bridge of the economic and political cooperation of Russia and the West closed only to military traffic going east or west.

No One Needs a 'Drang Nach Osten'

The possibility in this connection of the expansion of NATO thanks to the admittance of Poland and a number of other countries would run counter to Russia's interests and the new concept of European security. No one is occupying Poland and no one threatens it either from the West or the East. Its desire to join up with West Europe as quickly as possible is perfectly understandable, but NATO is hardly the best mechanism for this. The main conduits of European integration are the European Community and the Western European Union, NATO, on the other hand, was and basically remains a military-political coalition of states intended for collective defense.

If Warsaw fears a revival of Russian aggressiveness, taking such serious steps on the basis of abstract assumptions would mean setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Truly, following the October revolt, the situation in Moscow remains unstable. But it is in such a situation that Poland and the West should refrain from actions which could push the pendulum in an undesirable direction. And were a new Russian geostrategic offensive against the West to become a reality in the future, Poland would have sufficient time for adopting the appropriate measures (membership of NATO included).

From the NATO viewpoint, extension eastward is fraught with several serious problems. Having commenced such a movement, stopping it would be difficult. The incorporation of Poland would immediately raise the question of the incorporation of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Once the forward edge of NATO ran along the border of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, the latter would naturally ask whether the alliance's defenses were not targeted against them. If not, why not admit them also? And then, in accordance with the same logic, the question of Russia would arise. Not to include it would mean making it unequivocally understood that NATO was aimed against Russia. And so on, to extrapolate this logic to the absurd, right up to Central Asia, China, and Japan.

Having shown itself historically to have been an effective mechanism of collective deterrence of a common enemy, NATO could perfectly well prove to be inadequate to the

new realities and tasks following the Cold War. The tragic epic of Yugoslavia has revealed NATO's incapacity for being a cease-fire and peace-keeping mechanism. The main role here is being performed by the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy.

Actions against regional aggression and for curtailment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles outside of the bloc's zone of operation (Iraq, North Korea) have been mounted without the knowledge of NATO.

Of course, it is not a question of it being time for the dissolution of the North Atlantic alliance. It is a factor of stability, and without it a dangerous vacuum would form on the European continent, primarily on account of the uncertainty of the role and place of a united Germany. The armed forces of NATO countries are being cut back appreciably and are being restructured for different assignments. A large part of the American forces will be withdrawn from Europe. The experience of interaction and the administrative structures and forces of NATO could be an important component of a future system of collective security in Europe.

But something else has to be seen. The main reason for the preservation of NATO in the foreseeable future is, for all that, the unpredictability of the further development of events within Russia and of the evolution of its foreign and military policy. It is for this reason that Russia will never obtain full membership of NATO. Its return to the path of imperial expansion and authoritarianism would simply revive NATO's original function as a mechanism of collective geostrategic deterrence of a common enemy. On the other hand, the establishment of democratic principles within Russia and its foreign policy would ultimately remove the need for NATO. A fundamentally different regional multilateral security organization aimed not against a common enemy but at observance of the rules of mutual relations and the peaceful solution of conflicts between its members should come to take its place.

Boris Yeltsin's message to the leaders of a number of NATO countries contained in principle the right idea of NATO and Russia being the guarantors of the security of the neutral states of Europe located between them instead of NATO's extension eastward. But in order for this idea to be embodied in practice, a simple statement of guarantees is not enough—a military and political concept of the rearrangement of Europe is needed.

Strategic Pillars of European Security

The armed forces of neutral countries should be reduced and restructured on the principles of nonaggressive defense. This would be in keeping with their modest economic possibilities and would reassure those in Russia who think in categories of worst-hypothetical-external-threat scenarios.

Abstracting ourselves from the CFE quotas, there are no rational reasons for keeping in the European part of

Russia 18,000 pieces of armored equipment and 4,000 aircraft—more than on the eve of World War II. Just as there are no reasons for Ukraine to keep 9,000 tanks and armored transport vehicles and 1,000 aircraft and helicopters. The territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic and also the Russian Moscow and Leningrad and the western North Caucasus military districts should be a zone of the reduced concentration of ground and air forces.

Clearly, the withdrawal of Russian troops from overseas will require prepared rear facilities, and, as a temporary situation, their concentration in the European part is permissible. But for the long term when the modernization and reform of the army are quite far advanced, the rear infrastructure should be brought into line with the necessary deployment of the forces, and the latter, with the potential military threats emanating chiefly from the southern and eastern directions. Otherwise the result will be the other way about: The presence of bases and facilities (built in the past for a war with NATO) will determine the stationing of the forces, and in turn will materialize military threats, frightening neighboring states and provoking them into countermeasures.

Agreements of Russia and the neutral countries should for greater confidence be tied in with NATO commitments. For example, undertakings should be given that NATO will not extend eastward and that members of the alliance will not deploy their troops, forces, or military facilities there. The troop and force levels of the NATO states would be additionally reduced and reoriented for the tasks of terminating conflicts and for peacekeeping. It would be useful to limit the development and deployment of conventional precision arms of enhanced range and destructive power. Finally, the development of the interaction and interdependence of rapid-deployment forces of Russia and NATO as a means of economization of resources and as a safeguard against military actions is needed.

To Avoid Subsequent Reproaches

Poland's membership of NATO could nip in the bud the building of the edifice of European security based on West Europe, the United States, Russia, and a large bloc of neutral states. And it is not a question of the Polish step unfailingly and immediately creating a military threat to Russia—a number of NATO countries (France, Denmark, Norway) do not have foreign troops on their territory, and Poland could follow their example. The danger is that this event could once again set in motion a chain reaction of the "filching" of the neutral security belt of Europe between the West and Russia, as a result of which they would once again come up against head-on opposition.

Russia's military engaged in long-term strategic forecasting would decide: Since NATO is without any visible reason moving eastward, it is Russia's duty to push back the defense lines as far westward as possible. This would influence Moscow's policy in respect to Kaliningrad.

Oblast, the Baltic, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the East European countries, and a buildup of forces in the European part of Russia would begin. Territorial and ethnic conflicts and clashes over the share-out of the military, including nuclear, legacy of the USSR would intensify. Russia's neighbors in the West would perceive this as a threat to their security and would get in the NATO waiting line.

Instead of in-depth reform and the strategic reorientation of defenses southward and eastward, Russia's military departments would return to their customary business—planning for a large-scale and conventional and nuclear war in the European theater.

As a result, things would be bad for everyone, but most of all for Russia with its economic, political, and military problems. After all, no concentration of troops and forces would diminish the vulnerability of the center of Russia simply by virtue of geostrategic factors and the overall correlation of forces. Of course, it would then be easiest of all to accuse the other side for all the problems. However, Russia's responsibility for a possible negative development of events has to be seen also.

It amounts to the uncertainty and fear that are engendered in neighboring states by the spasms of the domestic and foreign policy of this vast nuclear power. It amounts to the absence of a new realistic military and political-legal concept of European security which Moscow could offer Europe as an alternative to NATO's extension eastward. Here it is up to Russia, there will be no help for us from overseas.

Footnotes

1. Classed as such were tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft and helicopters.
2. Specifically, it is a question also of the quota for Russia's flank zone, which prevents an increase in forces in the North Caucasus Military District.

Petrovskiy Appointed CD Secretary General

94P50038A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 19 Nov 93 p 4

[UN Informcenter item: "Appointment at the UN"]

[Text] UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali has appointed Vladimir Petrovskiy [former USSR deputy foreign minister], director general of the UN branch in Geneva, to be secretary general of the Conference on Disarmament [CD], and has given him the function of being his personal representative to this conference. A representative of the UN secretary general reported that Vladimir Petrovskiy will assume this office as of 5 December of this year and will fulfill these functions simultaneously with his duties as director general.

More Russian Claims of Improperly Stored Missiles in Ukraine

LD2611200493 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1325 GMT 26 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Nov—Continued storage of nuclear ordnance in such conditions in the Ukraine is absolutely impermissible. In order to avert a disaster, every step must be taken to immediately remove nuclear ordnance for dismantling and destruction in Russia, according to a statement made by directors of Russian federal nuclear centers, academicians, and chief nuclear weapon designers and forwarded today to ITAR-TASS.

The specialists say that recent checks on the state of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory uncovered a series of dangerous breaches of the rules: Storage facilities over-filled with nuclear weapons on the highest state of readiness; the absence of systematic technical maintenance of nuclear weapons; tardy replacement of parts whose guarantee has expired and that have lost their functionality; failure to observe transportation rules; conduct of repairs and checks not provided in documentation on missile systems carrying nuclear warheads. The specialists stress that the situation is made worse by substandard guarding of nuclear ordnance, and the collapse in Ukraine of the strict system for use and security of nuclear weapons that existed in the USSR and still operates in Russia.

Certain politicians are misleading the public when they say that nuclear weapons can be dismantled in Ukraine, the representatives of Russia's nuclear industry say. We know that Ukraine has neither the expertise nor the industrial facilities to dismantle them. Foreign expertise cannot be relied on to dismantle nuclear weapons made at Russian factories. No professional person will attempt to disassemble a nuclear weapon designed in a foreign country using unknown technology. Nuclear weapons can only be safely taken apart at the factories that made them.

Commentary on Problems with CFE

FM0112095593 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 30 Nov 93 p 7

[Article by Leonid Timofeyev: "Armored Vehicles Are Strong, but Cut Up Quite Well"]

[Text] In November it is a year since the conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] treaty came into force. The schedule began at the same time in accordance with which the countries of the former Warsaw Pact must destroy 35,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces and NATO 16,000 by 1995.

Recently the NATO representatives have been making statements claiming that 2,000 heavy vehicles which were to be destroyed have been "lost" on the expanses of

the former USSR. But the facts attest that these statements should not be applied to Russia. At the Russian Federation Defense Ministry your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent was assured that the vehicles are being "cut up" according to plan.

Russia will undoubtedly travel its part of the way. But military men and diplomats believe that serious problems have arisen for its security with the change in the political map.

With the loss of the Transcaucasus and Odessa military districts Russia has received a minimum of combat vehicles at its Southern, very unsettled borders.

In addition social problems are being aggravated in connection with the fact that we do not have an opportunity to deploy on our Southern flank the units which are being withdrawn from Western Europe. Russia has raised the question of amending the terms of the treaty.

NATO realizes that the "flank" problem exists for Russia and that it must be resolved. But a lot of thought will have to be devoted to how to do this.

Strategic Missiles Officer on START Treaties

94WC0016A Moscow MILITARY NEWS BULLETIN
in English No 10, Oct 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Maj. Gen. Vladimir Nosov, chief, Strategic Missile Forces Operational-Tactical Studies Center: "Strategic Arms Cuts: Parity and Stability"]

[Text] The 20th, nuclear century has entered its last decade, noted for the transition of the two superpowers from nuclear confrontation and the arms race to the reduction of their arsenals. The leading politicians of the two countries have agreed that further increase of their nuclear capabilities will not strengthen strategic stability or peace; on the contrary, it is a direct threat to human civilisation.

This understanding did not appear out of the blue. Thanks to international efforts, a number of major agreements were signed in the 1960s and 1970s that made this world a safer place, proved that many problems can be resolved at the negotiating table and provided a mechanism for drafting and implementing such agreements. They also paved the way for the signing of strategic arms reduction treaties in 1991 and 1993.

The Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, signed in December 1987, holds a special place among these agreements. It was the first treaty which not only limited but ensured the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons. It provided a theory and practice for signing and implementing such agreements, and the START-1 and START-2 treaties were drafted and signed with this experience in mind.

The START-1 Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, was a result of many years of painstaking work.

The sides learned to overcome major difficulties on the way to mutual understanding on the problem of ensuring equal security, coordinating quantitative levels of weapons sufficient for defence, and qualitative limits on the development of individual weapon systems.

The point of departure in that treaty was the data on strategic nuclear weapons as of September 1, 1990 that the two sides exchanged. At that time the USSR had 2,500 delivery vehicles and 10,271 warheads, while the United States had 2,222 and 10,371, respectively.

The homework done by the two sides when substantiating and coordinating the provisions of the START-1 Treaty provided the basis for signing the next START treaty in Moscow. But this does not mean that it was done easily. Like the START-1 Treaty, it was a very complicated document.

According to its main provisions, the USSR and the United States will reduce and limit the number of the ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and their warheads so as to have no more than 3,800-4,250 warheads after the treaty has been in effect for seven years, including no more than 2,160 warheads on SLBMs, and no more than 1,200 warheads on MIR Ved ICBMs. The number of warheads on heavy ICBMs must not exceed 650. At the next stage of reductions (by January 1, 2003), the parties should have no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads, including 1,700-1,750 on SLBMs, with all MIR Ved ICBMs eliminated.

The successful completion of the painstaking work on the treaty is linked, with good reason, to the desire of Russia and the United States to demonstrate the new, cooperative nature of their relations, and reduce the nuclear threat to the world considerably. Experts believe that Russia's security will not decrease, despite a reduction of its nuclear arsenals by nearly two-thirds. Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces will become more stable owing to an increase of the respective share of highly viable land-based monoblock missiles.

On the other hand, while reducing their nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States have the right to expect that the other nuclear powers (Britain, France and China) would join the disarmament process in the near future.

The parties signed the START-2 Treaty in the belief that it would enter into force after Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratify the START-1 Treaty and fulfil their obligation to join the non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear states.

The problems arising in the relations between the Commonwealth states where nuclear weapons are deployed (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) may greatly change the potential composition of the Strategic Missile Forces, both as regards the number of launchers, missile regiments and divisions, and the areas where they are deployed. By the end of implementation of the START-2 Treaty, the combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile

Forces will be determined by their composition and the characteristics of their weapons. Obsolete missiles are to be replaced with a modernised missile complex.

One of the main aspects of the START-2 Treaty is the May 26, 1972 obligation for the two sides to limit missile defence systems.

Russia is currently preparing to implement the arms reduction treaties and is elaborating a possible structure for its Strategic Missile Forces.

In view of economic difficulties and disruptions in production cooperation, it is suggested that the production of existing types of missiles to fit a monoblock warhead should be resumed, and these missiles should replace missiles that are becoming obsolete. This would give us more time to introduce a modernised missile complex. But we don't think this attitude has a future.

First, according to the treaty, MIR Ved ICBMs will not exist after the year 2003, whereas nearly all our missiles have MIR Ved warheads. Even if they are fitted with a monoblock warhead, they will still be regarded as carrying the number of warheads set in the Memorandum. In other words, this will be regarded as a violation of the treaty.

Second, the resumption of the production of existing missile systems with a monoblock warhead is not expedient, as their combat effectiveness will be low.

Third, the resumption of the production of existing missile types, their deployment and later replacement with a modernised complex, will entail much greater financial outlays than needed for the production and deployment of new-generation missiles.

And fourth, strategic parity will be reached only if we replace the old MIR Ved missiles with a modernised monoblock missile system.

This means that Russia's Strategic Missile Forces will remain in constant combat readiness as the core of nuclear deterrence despite a dramatic reduction of strategic weapons. The contribution of these forces to effective responses by strategic nuclear systems will increase by the year 2003, if the modernised monoblock missile system is introduced and the temporal probability parameters of the combat control system are improved.

The dramatic reduction of offensive strategic weapons, as provided for in the treaty, is complemented by deep qualitative changes in the structure of strategic forces of Russia and the United States that will strengthen their strategic stability considerably.

Our reference: Nosov, Vladimir Timofeyevich, was born on August 16, 1940 in the village of Urlyutyub, Pavlodar Region. He graduated from the Higher Command School of Engineers in Rostov, the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy, and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. He was chief of the Operational Directorate of the Main Staff of the Strategic

Missile Forces when he was appointed Chief of the Centre of Operational-Tactical Studies of the Strategic Missile Forces in 1988. He is a candidate in military science.

BELARUS

Arms Destruction in Compliance With Treaty Detailed

LD2711031893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1813 GMT 26 Nov 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin]

[Text] According to Major-General Viktor Vakar, head of Belarus's National Agency for Control and Inspection (NAKI), in the 16 months that have passed after Belarus signed the treaty on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe, it has rid itself of 25 percent of its tanks, aircraft and armored vehicles subject to destruction under the treaty.

The second set of measures the treaty involves will be launched on December 1 and will take a year to carry out, Vakar told Interfax. By the end of 1994, the proportion of materiel destroyed might reach 60 percent, but lack of funds could make this difficult, he said.

NAKI estimates put the cost of destruction of one aircraft, one tank and one armored personnel carrier at \$6000, \$2000 and \$1000 respectively.

By November 17, 1995, Belarus is to destroy 50 percent more military hardware than the amount to be scrapped by the United States, France and Britain put together.

"The total cost of the reduction of armaments under the treaty, including the expenses on their transportation to the places where they are to be destroyed, the removal of the scrap metal, the services of experts, and the reception of inspectors, is about \$33 Mn," the general said. He said that, if the government were unable to raise the sum, it might have to cut down on some of its social programs.

Vakar said the Belarusian Defense Ministry had drafted and sent to the U.S. administration several programs to span a period until 1996 for assistance to Belarus in reforming its armed forces. They include "a program for the delimitation of military potential, which involves the creation of centers for retraining retired military personnel, and a program of assistance in the conversion of Belarusian military industrial enterprises," he said. The programs would cost some \$860 Mn to implement, the general said.

KAZAKHSTAN

Emergency in Semipalatinsk

AK241114093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Andrey Vaganov report under the "Security" rubric: "Accident in Semipalatinsk-21. If the Testing Ground Capital Is Evacuated, Underground Nuclear Device Will Be Left Neglected"]

[Text] The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editorial board has learned from competent sources that an emergency situation has arisen in the city of Kurchatov (Semipalatinsk-21) located within the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground (Kazakhstan). Following a series of accidents in public utility networks, the city's life support system has effectively broken down. There is no need to explain what it may lead to in the conditions of a harsh winter that has already begun. Kazakhstani authorities and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are considering evacuating several tens of thousands of residents from this settlement, which has until recently been closed to outsiders, including a unit of the Russian Armed Forces that provides support services to the nuclear testing ground.

Material damage has been as yet hard to estimate. At any rate, according to experts' tentative estimates, it may amount to billions of rubles. No billions, however, can measure the immense increase in risk for human lives given that a test-ready nuclear device stored in a Semipalatinsk testing ground silo has remained there since 1991. I have already had an opportunity to report (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA No. 150, 1993) that developing methods for extracting and defusing it alone will cost hundreds of millions of rubles. In the event of the Russian military unit's evacuation, this and many other testing ground installations packed with up-to-date research and diagnostic equipment will effectively be left without appropriate servicing technology.

Construction of the city of Kurchatov, situated on the banks of the Irtysh river—the capital of sorts of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground—began over 40 years ago together with the launch of the Soviet program for the development of nuclear weapons. Apart from specialized areas equipped for conducting underground nuclear explosions, presently there are two reactor systems on the testing ground: IGR (impulse uranium-graphite reactor in operation since 1 August 1961) and "Baykal-1," made up of two research nuclear reactors—IVG-1M and RA (in operation since 7 March 1975).

Following the USSR's collapse, after the Semipalatinsk testing ground had become part of Kazakhstan's nuclear center, specialists have repeatedly expressed their concern over the future of the military unit servicing the testing ground. Numerous legal and logistical matters that have yet to be settled by Russia and Kazakhstan with regard to the Semipalatinsk testing ground have

been steadily sapping the unique unit's strength, particularly affecting highly qualified officers and also civilian nuclear scientists. The recent events may become the straw that definitively breaks the back of the unique staff. However, Kurchatov's emergency situation in itself, according to some experts with whom I have had a chance to speak, has been made possible precisely because of the brain drain depriving the city of qualified specialists.

Is this a process under way? If so, then it is the "Baykonur" space center—another time bomb in Russian-Kazakhstani relations—that is bound to be its next victim.

UKRAINE

Ukrainian Ratification of START I and Ensuing Uproar

Kiev's Pre-ratification Positioning

LD1611200593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed a draft resolution on the ratification of the START-I Treaty if "Ukraine is granted a compensation for its tactical and strategic nuclear arms pulled out of its borders and guarantees of its security." This statement was made by a member of the parliamentary commission for defense and security, Vladimir Kolinets, at a press conference in Kiev today.

Kolinets took part in a joint meeting of the working group for preparing the necessary documents for the ratification of the treaty, defense and security commission and legislation and legality commission. The meeting decided that the Ukrainian parliament will begin the consideration of the issue at its evening sitting on November 17.

According to the draft resolution, Ukraine is to reduce its strategic missiles by 36% and nuclear warheads by 41.6%, Kolinets said.

Ukraine expressed its readiness to ratify the Lisbon Protocol to the START-I Treaty without the article on its joining the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state, the deputy added.

254-9 Ratification Vote

AU1811170493 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT
18 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, Nov 18 (AFP)—The Ukrainian Parliament ratified the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on Thursday by 254 votes to nine, parliamentary sources said.

But the resolution also said Ukraine would remain in possession of nuclear weapons, saying it would not be bound by Point 5 of the Lisbon Protocol.

The government agreed to destroy 36 percent of its missiles and 42 percent of its warheads, in keeping with START and Article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol, according to the resolution passed by the parliament in a closed session.

The statement said "all nuclear warheads on Ukrainian soil are the property of the Ukrainian state."

"Ukraine plans to liquidate its nuclear weapons gradually but only after obtaining security guarantees" from other nuclear states after they pledge "nuclear non-aggression" and "guarantee an absence of economic pressures."

Kiev, which considers that 46 Ukrainian-built SS-24 are not covered by the START-I treaty, did not exclude the possibility of eliminating some or all of these missiles at a later date.

START I Ratification Resolution

LD1911113393 Kiev UNLAR in Ukrainian 2130 GMT
18 Nov 93

[Supreme Council Resolution on the Ratification of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the Protocol to it, Signed in Lisbon on Behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992—UNLAR headline]

[Text] The Supreme Council of Ukraine resolves, as follows:

On behalf of Ukraine as a successor to the former USSR, the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty), signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, be ratified with the inclusion of the following documents that constitute part of the Treaty:

The Memorandum [of Understanding] on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty;

The Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty;

The Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty;

The Protocol on ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] and SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty;

The Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to this Treaty;

The Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to this Treaty;

The Agreed Statements Annex;

The Terms and Definitions Annex;

The Protocol to the Treaty, signed on behalf of Ukraine in Lisbon on 23 May 1992, except for Article 5.

[The Treaty will be ratified] with the following reservations in respect of the Treaty and the documents that form an integral part thereof:

1) In accordance with the Vienna Convention on Legal Succession in Respect of State Property, State Archives, and State Debts and the Law of Ukraine on Enterprises, Establishments, and Organizations of Union Subordination, Situated on the Territory of Ukraine, of 10 September 1991, as well as the Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine, all the property of the strategic and tactical nuclear forces, deployed on the territory of Ukraine, including their nuclear warheads, is the state property of Ukraine.

2) Ukraine does not regard Article [number indistinct] of the Lisbon Protocol as obligatory for itself;

3) Having become the owner of the nuclear weapons that descended to it from the former USSR, Ukraine will exercise administrative control over the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory;

4) Having suffered the grave consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the people of Ukraine are aware of their great responsibility before the peoples of the world for a nuclear war not to begin on Ukrainian soil. That is why, Ukraine will take appropriate measures to prevent the use of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory;

5) As the state that owns nuclear weapons, Ukraine will move toward nonnuclear status and will gradually rid itself of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, on the condition that reliable guarantees of its national security are extended to it, whereby the nuclear states will assume the obligation never to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, not to use conventional armed forces against it, and not to resort to a threat by force, to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Ukraine, and to refrain from economic pressure with the aim of settling any contentious issues;

6) The reduction and further elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons, deployed on the territory of Ukraine, will be carried out in accordance with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 31 July 1991 and Article 11 of the Lisbon Protocol so that 36 percent of delivery vehicles and 42 percent of warheads will be subject to elimination. This does preclude a possibility of the elimination of additional delivery vehicles and warheads in accordance with procedures that may be determined by Ukraine;

7) Ukraine will perform its obligations under the Treaty within the timescale provided for, on the basis of legal, technological, financial, organizational, and other possibilities, with the proper nuclear and ecological safety ensured. The present crisis in the economy of Ukraine

taken into consideration, the performance of these obligations is only possible on condition that sufficient international financial and technological assistance is available.

8) The validation and implementation of the Treaty will not give the member states of this Treaty any grounds to seek any unilateral advantages for any entities of theirs on high technology markets, in scientific and technological exchange and cooperation in the field of the application of nuclear power to civilian purposes and the use of rocket technologies, which may be to the detriment of the national interests of Ukraine; 9) If the nuclear warheads, deployed on the territory of Ukraine, are dismantled and destroyed outside it, Ukraine will exercise direct control over these processes with the aim of ensuring that the nuclear components of these warheads are not used to recreate nuclear weapons;

10) The conditions and priority of removing the nuclear warheads to be dismantled and destroyed, will be determined by a special agreement or agreements, which will make provision for the components of the nuclear weapons to be returned to Ukraine to be used for civilian purposes, or their value to be compensated.

The conditions of compensation will also apply to the tactical nuclear weapons that were removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia in 1992;

11) Proceeding from the fact the Ukraine did not directly take part in talks on elaborating the Treaty, it is recommended that the president of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine hold talks with the relevant states and international organizations:

1. regarding international guarantees of Ukraine's national security;
2. regarding the conditions of economic, financial, and scientific-technical assistance in fulfilling treaty obligations;
3. regarding guarantee period [MN:vern:harantiynyy] and manufacturer's [MN:vern:avtorskyy] servicing of nuclear warheads of combat missile complexes;
4. regarding reviewing conditions of financing inspection activity envisaged by the Treaty;
5. regarding the possibility of utilizing silos for peaceful purposes under reliable control [kontrol];
6. regarding conditions of utilizing arms materials, which are broken up and which will be withdrawn as a consequence of eliminating nuclear weapons;
7. regarding guarantees of compensation for the material value of the components of nuclear weapons.

12) It is recommended that the President of Ukraine confirms the timetable for eliminating the strategic offensive armaments determined by this resolution, and ensures control [kontrol] over its implementation.

13) The Cabinet of Ministers, when reshaping the budget of Ukraine for 1994, is to envisage the expenditure on fulfilling Ukraine's obligations under this Treaty in a separate article.

Ukraine will only exchange ratification certificates after the conditions, set forth in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 above, are implemented.

The Supreme Council of Ukraine hopes that the nuclear states, that are not party to the Treaty, will join Ukraine and other legal successor states of the former USSR, as well as the United States, in their efforts and begin the reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

The validation and implementation of the Treaty will open the way for the Supreme Council of Ukraine to settle the issue of the accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1961.

[Signed] Chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine
[Ivan Plyushch]

INTERFAX Announces Ratification

LD1811203793 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2016 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] At its evening session Thursday Ukraine's Supreme Soviet ratified the START-1 Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). As many as 254 deputies voted for and 9 against. At present the Ukrainian parliament is made up of 440 deputies.

The parliament has also ratified the Lisbon Protocol. However, the session's resolution says that "Ukraine does not view Article 5 of the Protocol as obligatory for itself." The Article stipulates that Ukraine should have taken the obligation to join the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] Treaty dated 1968 as a non-nuclear state.

The resolution also says that in accordance with the Vienna convention on legal succession and with a decision of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, all property of the former USSR, including strategic nuclear weapons stationed on the Ukrainian territory, is Ukrainian property.

According to the resolution, Ukraine exercises administrative control over strategic nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. "Having become an owner of nuclear weapons due to historic reasons, Ukraine will never authorize their utilization," says the document. "On the contrary, Ukraine considers itself responsible for preventing a war from ever being begun from its territory."

In its drive for non-nuclear status, Ukraine appealed to all nuclear states of the world not to use nuclear weapons against it and to reject economic pressure in order to implement their political goals.

In accordance with the resolution Ukraine pledges to fulfill obligations on the START-1 Treaty only if it is granted guarantees of economic assistance and compensation for nuclear weapons withdrawn from its territory.

Provisions on granting compensation also include tactical nuclear weapons which have been withdrawn from Ukraine earlier.

If dismantling and utilization of nuclear warheads takes place outside Ukraine, Kiev will exercise control over this process to rule out any possibility of further use of those arms.

Ukraine's Supreme Soviet has recommended the country's president to negotiate issues on granting security guarantees to the republic, conditions of economic assistance, guarantees of compensation for nuclear warheads, and utilization of strategic silos for peaceful purposes.

The parliament has also proposed that the president confirm the schedule of nuclear weapons withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and that the parliament itself provide for expenditures for nuclear weapons shipment in the 1994 budget.

The resolution indicates that Ukraine hopes that all nuclear states of the world would undertake appropriate moves to cut down their nuclear arsenals. The resolution also says that "fulfillment of commitments on START-I Treaty on the part of Ukraine will advance its joining the NPT Treaty."

Pavlychko Says Ratification Document 'Balanced'

LD1911184093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 19 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—On 19 November, Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Foreign Affairs, commenting at the request of a UNIAN correspondent on the signing of the START I Treaty, pointed out: We are waiting for a response from the world community. People who read this document in depth will understand that it is deeply reasonable, balanced, and wise because it does not contradict the statements on this issue approved earlier by the Supreme Council. We did not refrain from the opinion that in the future, Ukraine would have no nuclear status but we said clearly and distinctly that this could happen only after we went through a certain stage of nuclear arms reduction. The stage-by-stage nature [of nuclear arms reduction] is the main idea maintained by the document. The most important aspect of the matter is this: We are the owners of nuclear arms that we have to turn into a financial and political force that will guarantee our borders, into ecological security. We are on the road toward non-nuclear status and we ourselves will determine its length. [no closing quotation marks as received]

Russian, U.S. Diplomats on Ratification

LD2011135593 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 19 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Kiev, [no dateline as received] To an attempt by a UNIAN correspondent to get comments from Russia's embassy in Ukraine on 19 November regarding the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopting a resolution

on ratifying the START I Treaty, Yevhen Tyurin, third secretary of the embassy, replied: "The Russian embassy is not authorized to comment on the decision of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, because it is waiting for an official reaction from [President] Boris Yeltsin and [Foreign Minister] Andrey Kozyrev." He also reported that the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Russia will be examining this issue next week, after which the embassy will inform the Ukraine public about Russia's official position.

Volodymyr Sulzhynskyy, first secretary and advisor on legal issues at the U.S. embassy in Ukraine [name and title as received], assessed the ratification of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol by the Supreme Council of Ukraine as a positive event and an important step by Ukraine on the path to disarmament. [passage omitted]

UN Envoy Explains Ukrainian Stand

LD1911224393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2050 GMT 19 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations, 19 Nov—Although Ukraine has ratified the START-I treaty, the nuclear disarmament process might be stopped if the republic does not receive the required international assistance and compensation for the nuclear potential being destroyed. This statement was made at a news conference given today at the headquarters of the community of nations by Viktor Batyuk, Ukraine's permanent representative at the United Nations.

"An historic event took place yesterday, when the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START-I treaty. This step was planned long ago, back in May 1992, when Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, in which it made the commitment to join the START treaty. Everybody has been waiting for this ratification, in order for the START-2 treaty to come into force," V. Batyuk observed.

"Why did it take so much time for Ukraine to ratify the START-I treaty? There were a lot of reasons for this. One was that the negotiations on this treaty were held without Ukrainian participation, so the Ukrainian parliament had to study all aspects of the impact of the treaty on Ukraine. We also did not want ratification of START-I to harm our national security. This is why we appealed to the major nuclear powers to commit themselves never to be the first to use nuclear and conventional weapons against Ukraine, to recognize its territorial integrity and never to apply economic measures to pressurize Ukraine," the Ukrainian representative said.

"In addition," he continued, "there was a large question mark over the economic impact and the need for international assistance to dismantle and destroy the nuclear weapons, for several countries promised a certain amount of aid. For example, the United States promised \$175 million, although our experts calculated that Ukraine needed \$2.5 billion for this purpose. Of course,

there were not enough of these promises for us. We wanted more guarantees of international assistance."

"Undoubtedly, the problem also arose of compensation for the fissile material. Last year Ukraine sent thousands of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia to be destroyed. To this day Russia is refusing to pay us compensation, although this material is worth billions of dollars. Since we are suffering an energy shortage, this material could of course be used in our nuclear power stations or to develop the Ukrainian economy. That is why this problem was widely discussed."

"Unfortunately, a positive solution has not been found for any of these problems. This is why the Ukrainian parliament decided to ratify START-I but also asked the president and government to continue negotiations on these issues. Only when they are solved will the instruments of ratification be amended."

"The Ukraine has also ratified the Lisbon Protocol except for paragraph 5, which binds signatories to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The Ukrainian parliament has announced that it will continue to work to turn the Ukraine into a non-nuclear state. Thus ratification of the treaty, under which we promised to destroy 36 percent of carrier rockets and 42 percent of nuclear warheads, is but the first step toward opening the way for full destruction of nuclear weapons and accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty," the Ukrainian diplomat said.

Asked by reporters when the Ukraine will begin destroying its nuclear weapons, V. Batyuk replied, "Destruction has in fact already begun. The press has already reported that 10 missiles have been dismantled and that there were about 80 warheads on these missiles. However, when the first three warheads were loaded onto a train for dismantling in Russia, we asked for guaranteed compensation for the fissile material. But they did not want to give any guarantees and the warheads are still in freight wagons. Russia says that our warheads are in poor condition. This is not true. They are exactly the same as the warheads Russia has on its own missiles.

So the process is underway ... I think that it will take about seven years for the START treaty to be honored. The process has begun and timetables for destruction will be drawn up. At the same time, the Ukraine will be trying to obtain guarantees of economic aid, safety, and compensation for fissile materials. If they are not obtained, then the process could be halted or lengthened," V. Batyuk stressed.

19 November News Conference

LD1911215893 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya
Network in Ukrainian 1710 GMT 19 Nov 93

[News conference by Supreme Soviet Deputy Speaker Vasyl Durdynets, Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, Defense

Minister Vitaliy Radetsky, and heads of the Supreme Council standing commissions Dmytro Pavlychko (foreign affairs) and Valentyn Lemishwith (defense and state security), with unidentified correspondents in Kiev on 19 November; speakers often unidentified as no video available—recorded]

[Text] **Durdynets:** Our news conference is dedicated to an important event. Yesterday, as you know already, Ukraine's Supreme Council examined the issue of ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty together with the respective Lisbon protocol, and ratified these important documents. Two hundred and fifty-four people's deputies voted for this resolution. To begin with, permit me to brief you on the essence of the issue, which will be followed by a question-and answer session.

As you know, the decision taken by the Supreme Council was preceded by almost a year-long comprehensive examination and a thorough joint analysis of the possible politico-military, economic, environmental and social consequences in the event of our state's compliance with this treaty which had been signed without Ukraine's participation. In their approach to the issue, Ukraine's Supreme Council, its standing commissions and the deputies' ad-hoc working group set up by the Supreme Council Presidium with the special task of working on relevant recommendations, proceeded both from Ukraine's noble intention to become a non-nuclear state in future and from the idea of inviolability of our state borders, as well as from other national interests.

In the course of an in-depth, comprehensive study of the problem and thorough discussions which, frankly speaking, were not simple, sometimes even excessively emotional, deputies focused their attention on such serious factors as the role of nuclear arms as a deterrent, our state's economic capabilities in terms of full compliance with the commitments implied by the treaty, and the possibility of guaranteeing environmental and nuclear security during the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

I would like to place special emphasis on the fact that the concept of the adopted decision implies no change in the attitude of the Supreme Council and the state leadership of Ukraine to our state's future non-nuclear status. In our work, we hoped and sought to convince the international community, first of all, the nuclear and other influential world powers, of the need to meet Ukraine halfway by providing reliable security guarantees and adequate financial assistance for the elimination of these weapons, and compensation for nuclear warheads, including tactical ones. Unfortunately, today we can state the fact that our hopes were futile. We have so far received no security guarantees in the full sense of the term, while the promises of assistance cannot be considered adequate in comparison with our needs, and the issue of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons remains unresolved.

Therefore, the Supreme Council, taking a decision to ratify the treaty, took account of all these aspects and proceeded from the real situation at hand. In practical terms, this means that Ukraine did ratify the treaty, with certain specific reservations that are reflected in the resolution adopted by the parliament.

Their essence is in the following: Ukraine is making the first step on the way toward a stage-by-stage elimination of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and proceeds from the fact that in compliance with the limits set by the treaty for the former USSR and the principles of equality of all the states-legal successors to the former Soviet Union it is obliged to reduce and subsequently eliminate 36 percent of the delivery vehicles and 42 percent of nuclear warheads of the strategic offensive weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine. However, at the same time, this does not exclude a possibility of eliminating additional delivery vehicles and warheads according to procedures that can be determined by Ukraine itself, which is reflected in the resolution. And this is an important aspect of the matter.

The resolution by the Supreme Council of Ukraine confirms the universally recognized status of Ukraine as the owner of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the former USSR by virtue of historical circumstances. Reaffirming its status as the owner of nuclear weapons, Ukraine is trying not to create prerequisites for taking operational control over these weapons. We emphasize, on a legal basis, our demands that compensation should be granted for the components of the strategic and tactical weapons which can be disassembled beyond its [Ukraine's] borders.

The Supreme Council reaffirmed the need to provide Ukraine with reliable guarantees of its national security and necessary financial aid for carrying out elimination undertakings and a proper compensation for the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons which are disassembled beyond its borders. President of Ukraine Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk was recommended to hold negotiations with relevant states and international organizations on a whole range of issues that are of a key importance for the fulfilment of the treaty by Ukraine.

In its resolution the Supreme Council of Ukraine determined that Ukraine did not consider Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol to be compulsory for itself. Therefore, at the current stage Ukraine is not joining the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty. In the course of a debate on this issue the people's deputies emphasized the fact that the treaty was laid down over 20 years ago and did not envisage the unique situation that emerged after the disintegration of one of the nuclear states—the former Soviet Union—and the formation of equal states-legal successors on its basis. The resolution stresses that the validation of the treaty and its implementation open up a way toward the Supreme Council of Ukraine solving the issue on acceding to the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty of 1 July 1968. This is a very important factor. I also draw your attention to this. Assessing the

situation in a comprehensive and balanced manner as a whole, the resolution indicates that Ukraine will exchange the instruments of ratification only after the above reservations are fulfilled.

All the importance and seriousness of the move made by Ukraine should be emphasized. This is a striking evidence of its intention to work consistently on implementing its peaceloving course and to follow the road toward achieving a non-nuclear status in the future. This is a concrete consideration of our own national interests and tendencies of the world development. We hope that this will be duly appreciated by the world public.

And now my colleagues and I are ready to answer your questions.

Correspondent: What were the objections put forward by deputies yesterday, and, second, what negative consequences will face Ukraine in external relations, the economy and national security?

Durdynets: Objections—those were not really objections, but as I said, we were talking about finding ways to guarantee the fulfilment of this treaty organizationally, financially, economically, and technically. Therefore, we were talking about the fact that the working group which cooperated with the standing commissions, together with the state executive structures and experts, was searching for options and decisions that would enable us to guarantee the number of nuclear weapons to be eliminated which, first of all, is implied in the treaty and the Lisbon protocol, and second, must be ensured economically and financially. The first thing they said: Prove it to us please that we have a comprehensive program that will be economically, financially and technically secured.

Unidentified Speaker: We will do our best to see that this hypothetical—as it is today and was yesterday—elimination program, being a complicated and comprehensive technical program, will become less and less expensive as far as is possible in the course of the work. We will do this in terms of know-how, and, for example, it is questionable whether it is necessary to create facilities for the elimination of 176 ICBMs, considering that they will stay idle thereafter, or whether such work can be done in Russia. Undoubtedly, if we see that such facilities or such specialized know-how are available for us to lease or employ on specified terms, we will go ahead with this to decrease the load on the budget.

Unidentified Speaker: If you look carefully at the Supreme Council resolution, you will see a number of questions that could be considered an answer to a range of issues which we had been unable to resolve before the treaty was submitted to the Supreme Council for ratification. The cause of it, as we can see, is, first of all, a certain lack of constructive attitude on the part of our negotiating partners, which, naturally, contributed to the absence of solutions to the important problem of national security guarantees, on the one hand, and, on the other, the problem of financial and technical aid. As

for the question about external consequences or any other problems, I believe, the Supreme Council made a significant step. By ratifying [the treaty] and adopting the resolution, it confirmed the intentions put forward in the respective Supreme Council documents on Ukraine's intention to acquire a non-nuclear status.

Correspondent: The NEW YORK TIMES correspondent has asked how soon Ukraine will complete the elimination of strategic offensive nuclear arms in accordance with the treaty.

Unidentified speaker in Russian: The period is determined by the treaty itself and the protocol, and, as you know, amounts to seven years. We adhere to the basic interpretation of the treaty, but, of course, will not follow it dogmatically. I think, some processes can go faster, which will illustrate our goodwill and initiative in this respect.

Correspondent: Tell me, please: Ukraine does not consider Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol to be compulsory for itself. It talks about a non-nuclear status. Is it possible to say now, after yesterday's decision, that Ukraine is a nuclear state? And the second question is to Valeriy Shmarov, [words indistinct] about item 7 where it talks about sufficient international financial and technical aid. Only be honest: How many billions? One, four, five, ten? How many? At least approximately. Thanks.

Unidentified speaker: As far as the nonproliferation treaty is concerned. Of course, at the current stage Article 5 excludes Ukraine's accession to this treaty. However, the resolution has a very debatable provision envisaging that after the treaty is validated and its provisions are implemented Ukraine will consider the possibility of acceding to the above treaty. I think it is unnecessary to state, and the Supreme Council resolution does not say that Ukraine is a nuclear state, and it does not say that Ukraine has an intention to take control over nuclear weapons. The resolution says clearly and distinctly that Ukraine is the owner of the nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR and it is necessary to proceed from this very fact. You must understand it yourselves, dear colleagues, that the status of a nuclear state and the status of a state-owner of nuclear weapons are entirely different things. By the way, a situation emerged here that we are the owners of the nuclear weapons with limited possibilities of operational control over these weapons and with limited possibilities of using these weapons. This very fact qualifies the status of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine.

Shmarov: The second part of the question. Mister correspondent from Moscow. I did not quite understand your question. How much money is necessary or how much they will give?

Correspondent: How much is necessary?

Shmarov: How much is necessary? Here is my reply. Calculations, although they should not be interpreted in

a dogmatic manner, have been made which say today that the fulfilment, the exact fulfilment of the terms of the treaty will require about \$1.6- \$1.7 billion. For a larger scope of work, say for a zero option, \$3.8 billion will be required, well, considering that this is during the term of the implementation [of the treaty]. World prices and all the cost of work and necessary equipment at world prices were used for these calculations. However, I already said today that we are doing everything possible, taking into account that some aid will certainly be rendered, but there will be more load on the budget of our state to make this program less expensive.

Correspondent: Can it happen that this resolution will just turn into an illusion in which Ukraine will have no money of its own for the creation of this infrastructure; they will give us nothing for the elimination; we will be compelled, to avoid a Chernobyl-type missile disaster, to take these missiles out to Russia; and will gradually take all of them out of Ukraine because we will simply have no money for their normal servicing?

Unidentified speaker: First, in compliance with the treaty not missiles but complexes, launchers, and silo launchers are subject to elimination. Now we are talking about the land-based missiles. This is why our obligations under the treaty will be controlled by this treaty's depositories in relation to whether we eliminated silo launchers or not, partially, because this is required by technical supplements to the treaty. This very work requires expenditures because, as far as the removal and utilization of missiles is concerned, this can even be a profitable part.. [pauses] well, not a profitable part but part of work that will partially diminish the financial load. This is why I would say that we believe that the work will be financed somehow on a mixed basis, on a mixed basis. We envisage in the budget, and the Supreme Council gave us such a resolution, that volume which we will require for the preparation of the programme in 1994...[pauses] and we will undoubtedly be doing everything possible so that the world community supports us economically with either aid or investments. Certain kinds of work according to the program can even be profitable programs and can yield profit. This is why we count on this as well, on the maximum possible reduction of the project costs.

[Question indistinct]

Durdynets: I believe that both Russia and the United States are interested, as we are, in the soonest possible implementation of this resolution. After the reservations, fixed in this document, are fulfilled, there will be an exchange of the instruments of ratification. In other words, I would like to look with optimism and hope that there will be a positive response. This, of course, is our wish.

Correspondent: Does the warheads elimination program, well, the program of nuclear weapons elimination in

general envisage this very situation, that is the elimination on the territory of Ukraine and tripartite negotiations?

Unidentified speaker: At present the nuclear weapons stationed on our territory, nuclear warheads, nuclear ammunition, are manufactured in Russia at the Russian nuclear industry plants. The sequence of actions is as follows: This ammunition, these products can be dismantled, disassembled, and utilized by those only who manufactured them. If we begin to approach this issue voluntarily, I think this may have a rather sad end. This is why today we have no realistic technical program whatsoever, as far as some kind of amateur utilization is concerned. We do not have this production cycle and we look at these things straightforwardly, that it will be utilized where it was manufactured. Undoubtedly, under condition of a compensation, which is stipulated in our resolution and reservations and the other agreement, under condition of a compensation for the cost of that combat uranium which is contained in these warheads [sentence as heard].

Durdynets: Such ideas really do exist, however, and they were expressed by various specialists. So far they have not been implemented in real, practical terms.

Correspondent: What will happen if Ukraine does not obtain the clear-cut political and economic guarantees or aid that it seeks from the West? Does this mean that everything you decided yesterday will be an illusion or Ukraine is ready to move forward [words indistinct] without the aid and without the guarantees?

Unidentified speaker: There are different forms of granting guarantees. There are guarantees granted through the system of the United Nations Organization. In particular, relevant resolutions that envisage granting guarantees are already available. This seems to be Resolution 205. There are other forms as well, and I think we must show certain flexibility while searching for a solution to this problem. We are ready, for example, to begin considering this issue and conclude relevant agreements at various levels: tripartite, quinquartite levels. For example, we could begin with the trilateral agreement and open it for other countries' accession. It could be possible to hold negotiations with all the nuclear states at one time, for example, trying to convince them of the necessity of granting such guarantees to Ukraine. I must say that we have already been doing, are doing, and will probably continue doing this work, proceeding from the Supreme Council resolution, with all the nuclear states so as to find a common language and solve this problem in the best possible way for our state.

Correspondent: Could it happen that this program in the budget will become yet another pretext for collecting all the hard currency, all the money available now with the subjects of economic activity, as it is being done now to support agriculture and other needs of the state? Will this not become a pretext for curtailing all reforms in Ukraine? Thanks.

Unidentified speaker: I think that these growing expenditures for the elimination [of nuclear weapons] will be somehow correlated by the fact that the Supreme Council made a decision on the armed forces reduction. This is why I think that the armed forces will be reduced to a certain extent on an annual basis. Expenditures for maintaining the army will decrease. I think this will to a certain extent facilitate the load on the budget and will give us an opportunity to maneuver, as far as finances are concerned, and implement this program. Well, on the other hand, of course, it will not be easy to implement it, because a situation will emerge, as far as the difficulty of implementing the program is concerned, and its implementation will be protracted. Yet, I support Mr. Anatoliy Zlenko concerning the fact that the world community will support us and will do everything possible so that the program be implemented in time.

Durdynets: During all the time of preparations for the ratification attention had been focused on those realities that Ukraine found itself facing today: economic realities, first and foremost. This is not a bargaining; we do not demand. We just say that today Ukraine has no possibility to allocate that necessary large sum of money from its poor budget to ensure in real terms the elimination of a large quantity of nuclear weapons. Therefore, I ask you to bear this aspect in mind, and it is around this aspect that we are to conduct our talk.

Kravchuk on Ratification

*LD2011212393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2049 GMT 20 Nov 93*

[Text] Kiev November 20 TASS—"I remain adherent to the political and strategic course outlined in the resolutions of the Ukrainian parliament and the statements of the Ukrainian president that Ukraine should become a nuclear-free state," Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said on Saturday.

He said the president and the government were guided exclusively by these goals in their activities prior to the ratification of the START-I Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

The statement followed numerous requests from CIS and foreign mass media to express his attitude towards the ratification of the treaty.

Kravchuk said he had passed over to the parliament a whole package of documents concerning the ratification of the START-I Treaty and the joining of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The documents contained a thorough analysis of military, political, economic, technical, ecological and social consequences of Ukraine's course towards nuclear disarmament, including its international aspects, the Ukrainian leader said.

The president's position on the ratification of the START-I Treaty and, in particular, on the joining of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has won broad support in Ukraine and in other countries. However, the

Supreme Soviet considered it expedient to ratify the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol with certain amendments. There are several reasons which may explain its decision, but the main one is that the world community has failed to take into account the complexity and specificity of the situation in Ukraine and was not active and willing enough to interact with Ukraine during the preparations for the ratification of the START-I Treaty.

Kravchuk confirmed that his position remains unchanged and stressed that despite contradictory assessments made in connection with the parliamentary resolution on the ratification, the document has important constructive aspects which will help further develop the process of nuclear disarmament.

He pointed out that gradual elimination of warheads and missiles does not rule out a broader approach towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and that the ratification of the START-I Treaty opens up new possibilities for joining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Another positive aspect is that the Ukrainian parliament has called on all nuclear powers to follow Ukraine's suit and begin reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Kravchuk also said that the president and the government of Ukraine will continue to work on the issue of nuclear disarmament to make Ukraine a nuclear-free state.

He expressed the hope that the world community, primarily the United States, Russia, France and Britain, will constructively cooperate and interact with Ukraine on this extremely important and complex issue.

Kozyrev on 'Alarming Impression'

*LD2011180193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1650 GMT 20 Nov 93*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Nov—Even a first acquaintance with reports on the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by Ukraine's Supreme Council leaves a most alarming impression. This was stated today by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, when he answered questions from ITAR-TASS and Russian Television's Vesti news program.

In effect, he emphasized, everything shows that Ukraine is declaring itself to be the possessor of the nuclear weapons located on its territory and is holding for itself the possibility of not totally eliminating these weapons within seven years, as the international commitments it has undertaken say.

On the other hand, it is not assuming the direct commitment to join, as soon as possible, the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear state. This is creating an extraordinarily serious situation for the whole system of international relations. First of

all in Europe, for the first time in many decades, a legislative body of power has put forward the demand for the collapse of the international regime of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. At issue is the appearance of a new nuclear state, the minister stated.

Russia, Kozyrev pointed out, has stated many times its readiness to guarantee Ukraine's security. A great deal of work has been carried out in this area to transfer nuclear ammunition to Russian territory and to eliminate it without any threat to the environment. In essence, a foundation has been created for a mutually advantageous solution, first and foremost for Ukraine, of these issues that are being used as a pretext to postpone the adoption of a decision to evacuate all nuclear weapons from Ukraine.

The minister noted that the Russian leadership is seriously studying the situation that has come about and is maintaining constant contacts with other leading countries of the world, since Ukraine's actions have created conditions for a possible shake-up of the entire system of international relations.

In Kozyrev's words: Moscow has noted reports that the stance of the Ukrainian president and government on this important issue is different from the position taken by the Supreme Council. He has already had a detailed telephone conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Zlenko during which they agreed to continue contacts and mutual cooperation aimed at seeking approaches to resolving the situation that has arisen.

Envoy to U.S. Comments

*LD2111193593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1911 GMT 21 Nov 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Mzareulov]

[Text] Washington November 21 TASS—Ukraine's Ambassador to Washington Oleg Bilorus told reporters on Sunday that the Ukrainian Parliament's resolution to ratify the START-I Treaty with certain reservations was prompted by the fact that Ukraine as a newly-independent state was now facing "unique" problems. The Parliament agreed to ratify the accord in case security and economic guarantees are provided to the former Soviet republic.

The ambassador referred to two main reasons prompting Ukrainian lawmakers to impose stiff conditions on ratification. First, nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil are to serve as "a powerful deterrent" to prevent Russia's attempts at any territorial claims to Ukraine. The very existence of Ukraine as an independent state is presently at stake, the ambassador stressed. Second, Ukraine lacks economic strength to fulfil all the provisions of the START-I Treaty. According to Bilorus's estimates, the country will need 2.8 bln dollars in foreign financial aid to safely dismantle all its nuclear weapons.

The ambassador noted that the Ukrainian Parliament had taken a positive, although incomplete step, and the results surpassed all expectations after a months-long gridlock.

Angry Russian Response

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Commentary

PM2311114993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Sergey Prokopenko report under "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "Ukraine Has Decided To Sell Its Nuclear Status a Little Less Cheaply"]

[Text] "It is time for us to stop portraying ourselves as a nuclear power"—this is how Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk commented on the decree "On Ratifying the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Armaments Signed in Moscow 31 July 1991, and the Protocol Thereto Signed in Lisbon on Ukraine's Behalf 28 May 1993," which has been adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament. So it is that by means of the adopted document the Ukrainian parliamentarians have ratified the treaty they call START I.

However, in the experts' opinion this decree, which was adopted with 13 major reservations, fundamentally alters the thrust of the previously adopted documents. In particular, the article in the Lisbon Protocol providing for Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the capacity of a nonnuclear state has been "bypassed." It is also stipulated that the full inventory [vse imushchestvo] of strategic and tactical nuclear forces located on Ukraine's territory, including their nuclear weapons [boyezaryady], constitutes the state property of Ukraine, which will thus exercise administrative control over the strategic nuclear forces on its territory.

The terms for Ukraine's gradual transition to nonnuclear status are defined by another reservation. In particular, these terms stipulate the acquisition of reliable guarantees of Ukraine's national security. The thrust of other "amendments" boils down to the irritating question of compensation and aid: Once aid is forthcoming, disarmament will begin. So it is that Ukrainian Government Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov reckons that in order to implement the START I Treaty—and I will remind you that Ukraine intends to destroy 36 percent of its carriers and 42 percent of its weapons [boyezaryady]—the republic requires between \$1.6 and \$1.7 billion, and some \$3.8 billion for their complete destruction.

The Ukrainian parliament's decree also states that Ukraine will undertake to exchange ratification documents only after all its terms have been met, and in the event that other states of the world join all the Union republics, the USSR's successors, and the United States in the process of cutting their nuclear arms.

It is evident that, even having stated their position in respect of their participation in the nuclear disarmament process, Ukraine's politicians have tried to extract the maximum advantage from this.

According to Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, incidentally, on these questions both Ukraine's president and its government occupy a position different from that of the Supreme Council. In his view, the Ukrainian parliament's decision creates a highly alarming impression. "In point of fact," he stressed, "everything indicates that Ukraine is declaring itself the possessor [obladatel] of the nuclear weapons located on the territory of that state, and is reserving the opportunity to avoid liquidating this weaponry in full over the course of seven years, as follows from the international obligations assumed by it. On the other hand, it is not assuming direct obligations to accede as quickly as possible to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the capacity of a nonnuclear state. This creates an extraordinarily serious situation for the entire system of international relations, above all in Europe. For the first time in many decades a legislative organ of power is gambling on the collapse of the international nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime, and we are talking about the emergence of a new nuclear state."

'Ready for Tough Measures'

PM2311094793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Maksim Yusin article: "Ukraine Rejects Nonnuclear Status. Russian Leadership Ready for Tough Measures"]

[Text] Relations between Moscow and Kiev have deteriorated sharply since the Ukrainian parliament, after formally ratifying the START-I treaty last week, effectively proclaimed that Ukraine henceforth considers itself a nuclear state.

The Kremlin's official reaction was not long in coming. Andrey Kozyrev stated Saturday that "the Ukrainian parliamentarians have essentially repudiated Ukraine's pledge to be a nonnuclear state and to accede in that capacity to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." In the Russian minister's opinion, "the proclamation of Ukraine as a nuclear state... would pose the threat of profound upheavals in the whole system of international relations." Kozyrev announced that the Russian leadership is holding "prompt consultations" with the leaders of leading countries.

Kiev's renunciation of nonnuclear status has caused an extremely sensitive reaction in Moscow. "The Ukrainians have violated the pledges that they made both in the international arena and within the CIS framework. Much of what was agreed by Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk in Massandra at the start of September has been overturned. How can we trust our Ukrainian partners after this?" a high-ranking Russian diplomat commented.

For him the Ukrainian Supreme Council's decision was no surprise. "Everything was heading in that direction. You only had to analyze Ukrainian politicians' statements over recent months to see that Kiev has long considered itself a nuclear state. Furthermore, representatives not only of the legislature but also of the executive expressed themselves in that vein." In my interlocutor's opinion, the disagreements on the "nuclear question" between the leaders of parliament and President Kravchuk should not be exaggerated: "Despite the fact that Kravchuk advocated a milder version of the resolution, his position is unambiguous. It was he who at various times voiced many ideas which have been reflected in the Supreme Council decision."

Moscow will hardly accept the appearance of a new nuclear state on its borders. As the Foreign Ministry has said, intensive consultations are now under way among various departments, and in the next few days an official position will probably be formulated with regard to Kiev and a decision made on possible retaliatory steps.

By all accounts, one such move will be the intensification of diplomatic pressure on Kiev. Especially since all the other nuclear powers express solidarity with Moscow's stance. Commenting on the Ukrainian parliament's decision and Moscow's reaction to it, Western diplomats accredited to the Russian capital have intimated that they largely share the Kremlin's concern. "We were a little surprised only by the harshness of Kozyrev's statement. However, that does not mean that we disagree with him," one diplomat said.

It cannot be ruled out that Moscow will resort to measures of economic pressure too. Admittedly, the Ukrainian parliament's resolution specially stipulates that Kiev considers such actions unacceptable. However, Moscow does not necessarily have to call things by their proper names. For example, Kiev's inability to settle its debts, which, despite the Ukrainian authorities' assurances, are rising inexorably, could provide the formal grounds for reducing supplies of natural gas to Ukraine.

On Smolenskaya Square [site of Russian Foreign Ministry] they prefer not to speak directly of economic sanctions for the moment. Nevertheless, asked about possible measures to exert economic pressure a Foreign Ministry spokesman who wished to remain anonymous said quite definitely: "The solution of all the complex questions in our relations (and that includes supplies of Russian gas to Ukraine) will depend on Kiev's position on the question of nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet and on the Ukrainians' readiness to fulfill earlier accords. In that sense the Ukrainian parliament's recent decision can hardly have a positive effect on Russian-Ukrainian relations."

IZVESTIYA Blames 'Stingy' U.S.

PM2911131793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Commentary by Stanislav Kondrashov: "That Kiev Is Holding on to Nuclear Weapons Is the Fault of Moscow and Washington"]

[Text] Ukraine has ratified the START I treaty, but with amendments bringing to the fore its intention to retain the status of a nuclear state. President Leonid Kravchuk effectively takes the same stance as the parliament. There are no disagreements between them on the two main prior conditions of Ukraine's movement toward nuclear-free status: broad guarantees of security against nuclear and conventional attack, and also financial and technical aid on fulfillment of the START I commitments. A specific sum is named in dollars—between 2.8 and 5 million.

This news story was carried in the Russian newspapers for only a day or two, but it does not belong to the transient category. Sergey Rogov, an authoritative specialist on nuclear weapons, is near to the truth in claiming that the Ukrainian nuclear weapons "could upset the balance of power in the world." If Kazakhstan follows Ukraine's example, Russia will be the only country with three (including China) immediate nuclear neighbors. It will be easier for North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan... to penetrate the nuclear club through the gigantic breach formed in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The dangerous bipolar world of the Cold War will be replaced by a multipolar nuclear (!) world that will be even more dangerous if weapons of mass destruction end up in the hands of 'marginal states.'

Surely Ukraine, having opened the Chernobyl chapter of history in April 1986, is not now going to be the source of a new, worldwide, military atomic danger?

Even without entertaining apocalyptic fears, one cannot fail to note that the central international clause of the December 1991 Belovezhskaya Forest Agreements has burst like a soap bubble. Relations between Moscow and Kiev are not developing in the way that was envisaged. And Washington has been deceived in its expectations that the Soviet nuclear heritage would end up in one safe—and moreover, democratic—pair of hands. However, there were, of course, not just expectations. In the course of a memorable telephone contact from Minsk between Boris Yeltsin and Washington, George Bush, learning of the end of the USSR before Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, at the same time received direct assurances concerning the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. This question, of course, was and remains the most important for the United States. The assurances and commitments were repeated when then Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Moscow that same December.

As we know, these promises and commitments continued to multiply in CIS documents, and in 1992—on

the Americans' initiative—took the form of an international commitment whereby Ukraine, along with Kazakhstan and Belarus, swore to take nuclear-free status and sign the Lisbon protocol.

Well, pardon the expression, were we all duped? Well, no; no premeditated, perfidious strategy is to be found. Only improvisation on all sides. And in the course of improvisation we saw, on the one hand, so to speak, a loss of vigilance, and on the other, an appetite which came with eating and peculiar nuclear temptations. Neither Moscow nor Washington carried out any serious work with Kiev, and, the more time passed, the more powerful were pronuclear sentiments there and the attraction to particular nuclear trump cards in foreign policy. And the worse Ukraine's economic position became, the more insuperable was the need for a "payoff" from Russia and, above all, from wealthy America.

The strong words of protest emanating right now from the Russian Foreign Ministry are, first, belated and, second, hardly help matters. Threats of economic sanctions are unrealizable—they will punish the people, not the politicians. In any case, sanctions will not take the place overnight of what has never existed, and, alas, still does not exist, in Russia's relations with Ukraine—well-considered, meticulous diplomatic work, which sporadic meetings between the two presidents have been unable to replace. Without getting hung up about apologies to our neighbor, it is essential that we look seriously at the terms it has advanced and attempt to work out a compromise.

The Russian Government's recently published statement calls the ratification of the START I treaty by the Ukrainian parliament "fictitious," providing grounds for international countermeasures including measures within the Security Council framework. At the same time it talks about Russia's readiness for "constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian side." It would be a good thing if the accent were placed precisely on dialogue.

Still greater complaints can be made against Washington. The well-established state, where no hitches are observed even during changes of president or secretary of state, did not notice that Russia's leaders, their heads plunged in internal political contention, lack strength, time, experience, and, finally, a real understanding of how far things can "go wrong" over the fate of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory if they are not purposefully channeled in the right direction from the very beginning.

Washington disappointed our expectations even more than Kiev—it let down the expectations of both Kiev and Moscow. In the new era Washington finds itself unsuited to the "elder brother" role, even though it was surely the democrats of Moscow and Kiev who initially pressed it to take on the role. The "elder brother" was not bold enough to use the methods of exerting pressure on the anarchistic heirs to yesterday's archrival and

enemy, and when it came to handing out the cookies—I think that this is the main point—it proved to be tightfisted and stingy. To the disappointment of the "younger brothers."

Visiting Kiev in October Secretary of State Christopher, tried and failed to gratify the Ukrainians with \$175 million instead of the \$2.8-5 billion requested for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament at the levels envisaged in the START I treaty. And Moscow, with envious eyes, was unwilling to do any prompting. Of course, no form of nuclear blackmail should be encouraged, not all demands but only well-founded ones should be met, and even in Washington money does not grow on trees. However, there are situations which test one's scale of thinking, one's ability to assess expenses and gains appropriately in the light of possible dangers. You cannot get anything for nothing—that is a rule of U.S. trade, including military-diplomatic trade. Seemingly, they forgot it.

What happened in Kiev last week adds to the list of Clinton administration foreign policy failures and blunders—a list which already includes Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Perhaps it does not simply add to it, but heads it.

Yeltsin Makes Threats

LD0112205693 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 30 Nov 93

[Article: "Russia Has Described the Ratification of START I as a False 'Start' and Is now Threatening Ukraine With Isolation"]

[Text] Repeated attempts by the president of Ukraine to telephone Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin and discuss the Ukrainian parliament's decision on ratifying "START I" proved unsuccessful. Not counting the rather strongly-worded reaction to the decision by Andrey Kozyrev, who perceives in it a desire on Ukraine's part to remain a nuclear state, there was no more official reaction from Russia for a long time. However there was a clear tendency to stir things up in the world's press. All the main papers in the world, from IZVESTIYA to THE WASHINGTON POST, concluded that Ukraine aspires to retain its nuclear weapons.

However, eight days later the government of the Russian Federation described the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of "START I" as "a sham" while the official position of the president of Russia in its final version was communicated to the Ukrainian side a day later.

VEDOMOSTI has learned from extremely reliable sources that last Friday Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent Leonid Kravchuk an extremely strongly-worded telegram about the consequences which may await Ukraine as a result of our parliament's recent ratification of "START I."

First, the Russian leader is laying down a lot of reservations, which greatly limit the extent of compensation

that Ukraine hopes to receive. As regards settlements for warheads already withdrawn to Russia, then to all appearances we will not receive a penny for them from Moscow.

Second, Boris Yeltsin is insisting that Ukraine destroy the solid-fuel missiles of the "Satan" type in the first instance. Moreover the president of Russia, it is reported, has demanded that the dismantlement of nuclear missile weapons be conducted in the minimum period of time, and has promised, should the opposite be the case, to get the world community to put pressure on Ukraine. He also resorts to such an argument as refusing to assist us with technical specialists, and also refusing to assist us in transporting nuclear weapons. It is true, a reservation follows that this is not a final decision.

Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] reproaches Ukraine for not being a reliable partner in inter-state relations, and indirectly recommends that Leonid Makarovych [Kravchuk] acts on the decision of the parliament on "START I," which he [Yeltsin] describes as "strange," as he reacted to the Sevastopol attack by the former Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

Apart from that, there is a good chance that the United States will fully support Moscow's stance: Very vigorous consultations are currently being held between the State Department and Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs. The variant of employing both political and economic sanctions against Ukraine is not ruled out.

It appears that no one from the superpowers and semi-superpowers intends to sympathize with Ukraine and take into account its catastrophically complex economic situation. No one intends to grant it the right to decide for itself which missiles it should get rid of in the first instance. But judging by the statement of B. Yeltsin, official Moscow is not very concerned that it is the liquid-fuel SS-19s that are threatening the ecologies of Ukraine and of all Europe, not the solid-propellant SS-24s. In addition, Russia is insisting, as in the times of stagnation, on Ukraine reporting ahead of schedule on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, forgetting that "START I" is envisaged for seven years, and not for one or two years. As far as the unwillingness to talk about compensation to Ukraine because our state was left nuclear weapons from the former USSR is concerned, then here it seems they forgot to prompt Boris Nikolayevich on the many hundreds of closed scientific research institutes and "post boxes" of the military-industrial complex of the former Union, which while having Kiev, Kharkov, or Dnepropetrovsk registration, worked on creating both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

In addition, attempts to drive a wedge between the Ukrainian parliament and president are highly dangerous. In spite of the existing differences, both branches of power should now as never before act in coordination and appropriately, and agree to mutual concessions and compromises, for an internal split will only contribute to

complicating the situation. Why, even animals in jungles declare a great truce during a drought...

Apropos [word printed in boldface] In the uncharacteristic IZVESTIYA article on 27 November entitled "Moscow and Washington Are to Blame for Kiev Holding on to Its Nuclear Weapons," Stanislav Kondrashov maintains: "Harsh words of protest, currently being heard from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, first have come too late, and second will hardly help the matter. Threats of economic sanctions are not feasible. They will punish the people, not the politicians. Anyway, sanctions will not instantaneously make up for something which has not existed, and alas does not exist in relations between Russia and Ukraine—well thought-out and laborious diplomatic work, which the infrequent meetings of the two presidents could not replace. Without dwelling too much on accusations concerning a neighbor, it is necessary to seriously examine the conditions advanced by him, having undertaken to attempt to elaborate a compromise."

The author goes on to write that "there are situations, when the scale of one's thinking and the ability to appropriately appraise expenses and gains in the light of possible dangers are tested. One should not get something for nothing—that is a rule of American bargaining, including military-diplomatic bargaining."

"What happened in Kiev a week ago adds to the list of foreign policy failures and false steps of Clinton's administration ..."

'Blow' to Nonproliferation

LD3011223993 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
2015 GMT 30 Nov 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva November 30 TASS—Reservations made by the Ukrainian Parliament when ratifying the START I Treaty hit a blow on the current regime of nonproliferation of nuclear arms, Russian permanent representative to the U.N. conference on disarmament Grigory Berdennikov told a news conference here today.

In fact, there was no ratification, as major components of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol and a major instrument of their implementation were removed, he said.

For instance, the Ukrainian Parliament excluded Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol. The article ensures Kiev's joining of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms as a non-nuclear state. What is especially dangerous is that it happened on the eve of a conference on open-ended prolongation of the Treaty scheduled for 1995. Ukraine has actually proclaimed itself the sixth nuclear power.

In the words of Berdennikov, Kiev has also violated the agreement signed in early September in Massandra, the Crimea, by the Ukrainian and Russian Government

heads to ensure the withdrawal of all strategic nuclear arms to the Russian Federation for further dismantling.

The Russian representative called attention to the danger posed by nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory which are no longer maintained by Russian specialists. Only Russian specialists can efficiently maintain the warheads and the missiles. Thus, all the responsibility for the state of nuclear arms rests on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Parliament resolution is not only the issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations, stressed Berdennikov. It also concerns other nuclear states, depositaries of the treaty on nonproliferation and the whole international community.

No doubt, neither the START I nor the START II Treaties can enter into force due to the Ukrainian steps. Berdennikov said they would like to convey Russian concern with Ukrainian actions.

Ukrainian Maneuvering After Ratification

Kravchuk Interviewed

*LD2211204093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1502 GMT
22 Nov 93*

[Excerpts] kiev—Interviewed today by a group of Ukrainian journalists, Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk commented on the Ukrainian Supreme Council's adoption of the resolution on the ratification of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. [passage omitted: agency quoting Kravchuk on non-uniform attitude of the world community toward newly independent Ukraine, covered by referent item]

Answering a question, "after the ratification of the treaty, is Ukraine nuclear or non-nuclear," Leonid Kravchuk said:

"Formally, nuclear status makes provision for three elements: using, commanding, and controlling nuclear weapons. In this particular case, Ukraine's ownership of nuclear weapons, as a notion, is not really meaningful. We cannot amuse ourselves with being the owners of nuclear weapons. We are not capable of using this property."

[Passage indistinct]. "Once we get started, we shall know what it is and how much it will cost, then we shall be able to tell the people what assistance we need," Leonid Kravchuk opined.

Answering a UNIAN correspondent's question on what guarantees from the United States, Russia, and Western countries would suit Ukraine, the president said that it could be a document, a statement by the president or government of a state, which would emphasize that, in giving up nuclear weapons, Ukraine is given guarantees of its territorial integrity and its status is confirmed. These might be guarantees which would spell out that Ukraine should not be regarded as a partner "capable of

unforeseen actions," as well as real guarantees of military, technological, and economic assistance. "It should not just be a wish but actual steps," Leonid Kravchuk pointed out.

Answering a UNIAN correspondent's question on what is the greater obstacle in the way of substantial economic assistance from the West to Ukraine—difficulties in ratifying the START I treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, or the Ukrainian leadership's own economic policy—Leonid Kravchuk said that he is convinced it is both issues. "The economic situation being unclear, the economic policy leaping backward and forward, and the leadership making ill-considered populist statements did and do cause concern throughout the world," he said. The president said that the course toward the market has already been determined in the budget for 1994 and the government's program to combat inflation. "We have made provision for 4,000 enterprises to be made joint stock companies as early as the beginning of next year."

As for compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons, Leonid Kravchuk recalled that, in accordance with the Supreme Council resolution, negotiations are to be held and calculations made with the participation of specialists. On the subject of strategic nuclear weapons, Leonid Kravchuk referred to an agreement between Ukraine and Russia, under which the year-plus-one formula was suggested. "How much it will cost is yet unknown, since there are no estimates. It has not been decided yet what we shall do: Shall we remove warheads, or eliminate delivery vehicles and silos, or do it all together? It is only when all the estimates are made that we can tell how much it will cost Ukraine," Leonid Kravchuk said. In his words, the United States has already come up with an initiative to help this process. Ukraine proposed that a nuclear fund should be set up to help step up assistance. [passage omitted: agency recalling Kravchuk's insistence on removing from the parliamentary resolution on ratification the clause on the numbers of strategic offensive arms to be reduced, and the reasoning behind it, covered by referent item]

At the end of the meeting, Leonid Kravchuk called for an understanding attitude toward the situation facing Ukraine. "We bear responsibility before our people and the world," he said.

Ambassador Explains Parliament's Stance

*MK2411135093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1*

[Vitaliy Portnikov report under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "Ukrainian Ambassador Defends His Country's Stance Following Moscow's Harsh Reaction to Ukrainian Reservations Over START I"]

[Text] Harsh statements by top Russian diplomats with regard to reservations made by the Ukrainian parliament during the ratification of START I and the Lisbon protocol could not but draw a response from the Kiev

authorities. Volodymyr Krzhanovskiy, Ukraine ambassador to Moscow, held a press conference the main theses of which—although the diplomat would not make direct comments on his Russian counterparts' statements—echoed what was said by the Russian Federation foreign minister. Krzhanovskiy (as a matter of fact, he is not only an ambassador, but also a Ukrainian people's deputy) called his parliament's decision balanced, not forced. The ambassador recalled that his country has never received any compensation for tactical weapons that have been withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. Presently Ukraine needs money to destroy nuclear weapons because its own resources are clearly insufficient. Moscow's emotional reaction only proves that "something that our partner had thought out fell through. We have done something not in the way Russia would like us to. They expected that we would procrastinate on this treaty for some time to come so that they could say about us: They do not want to do anything. We have ratified the treaty, however." As for Andrey Kozyrev's statement on a lack of coordination between the actions by Ukraine's executive and legislative branches, the ambassador called it just a statement of facts: "What Mr. Kozyrev says is that he would like somehow to exploit this inconsistency. But this is the only thing he could do now. There is no parliament in Russia so far, so it is impossible to act through parliamentary structures, or to convene the Russian-Ukrainian parliamentary group, which could have been able to help mend the Ukrainian parliament's ways, because it unfortunately does not act as the Russian side would like it to—for it professes not Russia's principles, but those on which Ukraine's interests are based. This is probably why Mr. Kozyrev will continue to cooperate with Ukraine's executive branch. To conduct talks. Because just to switch off the gas—this reminds me of a childish feeling of offense. This is just the first reaction..."

As if responding to a remark by an unidentified, albeit high-ranking, Russian diplomat, who expressed regret in an interview for INTERFAX regarding an overly soft stance adopted by the West, which is allegedly interested in Russian-Ukrainian differences, Volodymyr Krzhanovskiy said that Ukraine has seen more understanding from the U.S. side than from the fraternal Russian state.

Meanwhile, it has transpired from informed sources that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev refused to meet with the Ukrainian ambassador.

Solicits Support From Belarus, Uzbekistan

AU2611195493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 25 Nov 93 p 5

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "In Diplomatic Circles": "They Have Passed on the Information"]

[Text] On Wednesday [24 November], Ukrainian Ambassador to Belarus Volodymyr Zheliba met with Aleksandr Sychov, Belarusian deputy minister of foreign

affairs. During the conversation, the Ukrainian diplomat stressed that the adoption of the decree [on START-I] by the Ukrainian Parliament is not in contradiction with its acquiring a nuclear-free status.

The Belarusian side agreed during the conversation that it is mandatory that Ukraine be provided with security guarantees and economic support on the part of other nuclear powers.

On the same day, Ukrainian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Volodymyr Smetanin met with M. Khalilov, deputy head of the Uzbek external political department, and handed him a note on ratifying the treaty and the [Lisbon] Protocol. Explanations were given to the Uzbek diplomat on Ukraine's position regarding nuclear issues.

Explanation Given to CSCE

LD2711141093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 27 Nov 93

[Text] Ambassador Yuriy Kostenko [minister of environment], head of Ukraine's delegation at the Vienna talks, gave an expanded explanation of the clauses in the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on ratification of the START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol at the latest sitting of the forum for issues of security and cooperation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Explaining the nature of this decision, he emphasized that the attitude of the Supreme Council, president, and Government of Ukraine to the nonnuclear future of our state has not changed and that the decision adopted by the Supreme Council should be described as the first step taken by our state on the path of gradual elimination of nuclear weapons located on its territory.

LE FIGARO Interview With Kravchuk

BR2911114793 Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Nov 93 p 4

[Interview with Leonid Kravchuk, president of the Ukraine, by Renaud Girard; in Kiev, date not given: "Kravchuk: 'The Ukraine Must Pursue Denuclearization'"—first six paragraphs are LE FIGARO introduction]

[Text] The Ukraine only won its independence in August 1991. But the euphoria which greeted the event is now long forgotten.

The inherited weight of the Communist system has crushed the enthusiasm of the young American or Canadian graduates—the grandchildren of Ukrainian immigrants—who returned to the land of their ancestors to help the government in Kiev to build a new society. Most of them have now made the return trip back across the Atlantic, such as the senior manager with the Bank of Boston who gave up a very comfortable salary to take up the post of deputy governor of the new central bank of the Ukraine.

After more than two years of independence, the Ukraine has still not managed to be rid of its past as a formerly model Soviet province and to set a new path once and for all, in economic and political terms.

With respect to the economy, the strategy pursued by President Kravchuk—democratically elected in December 1991 with 62 percent of the votes—, a mixture of disorganized liberalization and steps backwards toward a planned economy, has led to an unprecedented social bankruptcy. Inflation is verging on 2,000 percent; deprived of raw materials, firms are simply ticking over; barter has become the principal medium of exchange; wages have failed to keep pace with prices; people survive only thanks to support within the family and the black market. The "karbovanetz," the money issued two years ago in order to leave the rouble zone, has lost more than 30 times its value against the Russian currency—which itself is hardly known for its stability.

More than anything else, the Ukraine suffers from its dependency on Russia for energy supplies. The time when oil and natural gas were virtually free is well and truly past. Moscow now demands payment in hard currency at worldwide oil markets. The energy bill alone absorbs 80 percent of the Ukraine's export revenue. The population has already been informed that it should not expect their apartments to be heated above 10 degrees centigrade this winter.

Politically, the central authority is relatively stable, thanks to President Kravchuk's skills as a political maneuverer. A former Soviet apparatchik, he has succeeded in steering a course avoiding both the pitfalls of super-nationalism and communist nostalgia. But on the international stage, the Ukraine is in the process of alienating itself from the powers which were most favorably disposed to this former Soviet province. They are concerned by Kiev's prevarication in the matter of nuclear disarmament.

Girard: On 19 November the Ukrainian parliament only voted for a partial ratification of the START I Treaty. During a previous interview, in January 1992, you told me that the Ukraine would be rid of all its nuclear weapons by December 1994. What is the situation regarding your country's denuclearization?

Kravchuk: It is true, at the time I told you that the Ukraine intended to become a non-nuclear state. I maintain this commitment. The Ukraine must pursue its policy of denuclearization. Because I remain convinced that there is no other solution for the Ukraine. The Ukraine is not going to build up its international prestige and reputation by possessing nuclear weapons, but rather by respecting the undertakings it has made and pursuing its policy of denuclearization. Unfortunately, our parliament failed to ratify all the documents I submitted for its signature. Why? First of all, because the world's other nuclear powers did not work together with us during the 12 months which preceded the START I agreement. They made no effort to understand our

particular situation and the concerns of a parliament with which they established no dialogue.

Girard: What is causing concern to the Ukrainian members of parliament?

Kravchuk: They fear the territorial claims which are being expressed in certain nationalist circles in Russia. Their vote reflects the opinion—which is widely held here—that nuclear weapons are a means of protection against threats to the integrity of Ukrainian territory. My opinion has not changed: The country must be denuclearized. But the West should understand that a president does not have the authority to run the legislative at will. Fortunately, the text approved by parliament allows me a certain margin of maneuver in order to continue diplomatic negotiations to achieve the conditions for our denuclearization. I intend to make full use of this.

Girard: If you are a candidate at next June's presidential elections, will you campaign for the Ukraine to be a signatory of the NPT [Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]?

Kravchuk: It all depends on the legislative elections next March. If the new parliament is dominated, as I would like it to be, by a majority of competent men who are able to understand the country's domestic situation and international interests, I will again go on the offensive. I will do everything in my power for the Ukraine to ratify the START treaty, the Lisbon protocol, and the NPT. But as I said, it all depends on the parliament.

Girard: Will you stand in June?

Kravchuk: You will know two months in advance, when the candidates have to register.

Girard: Dismantling nuclear weapons is an expensive process. What are you expecting from the West?

Kravchuk: Reciprocal action. The West must understand that the text approved by parliament does not under any circumstances mean that the denuclearization process has arrived at an impasse. It allows the executives in the different countries to continue to work in concrete terms. Rather than speculating on the consequences of this vote, the West would do better to provide me with technical and financial assistance in order to destroy the nuclear warheads! I am also ready to make a gesture to ease international concern. I am ready to start defusing our nuclear missiles and even to dismantle a part of our warheads, while awaiting the time when we can completely dismantle all our nuclear weapon sites.

Girard: But what specifically do you want from the West?

Kravchuk: Above all else, security guarantees. You must understand the fears of the Ukrainian people.

Girard: Are you hoping for defense agreements, or NATO membership perhaps?

Kravchuk: No, but simply declarations by the major nuclear powers undertaking not to attack the Ukraine and, at the same time, to guarantee its territorial integrity. If we receive such undertakings from Russia, the United States, France and Great Britain, the Ukrainian population will feel they are living in safety.

Girard: On 1 October the five permanent members of the UN security council thanked Russia for its action in maintaining peace in the former USSR. What do you think of this declaration?

Kravchuk: I find it premature to say the least. Without wanting to judge the responsibility of any of the parties in complex ethnic conflicts, the fact is that Russian troops were often locally involved. Before applauding a country as a "peace-keeper" you must first be sure that its action is not in any doubt.

Girard: Are the conditions present for Crimea—which only left Russia under Khrushchev—to become a new Abkhaz Republic? After what has happened in Georgia with the Abkhaz minority, do you not fear that Crimea, whose population is mainly Russian, will soon revolt against the Ukraine?

Kravchuk: There are two reasons why the situation in Crimea cannot degenerate into a conflict of the Georgia-Abkhaz type. First of all, there is constant dialogue between Russia and the Ukraine. At the outset, I took the initiative for a negotiated regulation of all questions relating to the status of the Black Sea—including, above all, Crimea. This initiative was approved by President Yeltsin and the process is functioning. The same applies to the dividing up of the Black Sea fleet. The different ethnic groups who make up the population in this region must understand that the interests of both the Ukraine—in whose territory it lies—and of Russia must be taken into account. Secondly, the Ukraine has granted almost total economic and social autonomy to Crimea. We do not dictate terms to Crimea.

Girard: Judging by the meddling of Moscow in the conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Tajikistan, do you not see a return to Russia's imperial policy?

Kravchuk: I would not like to state in such a direct way that there is a return to Russian imperialism. But it is clear that there does exist a strong heritage of imperial policy as pursued first by the tsars and then by the Soviet Union. We must also remember that there are 25 million Russians living in the territory of the former USSR. It is not realistic to expect Russia to give up all its interests outside its own territory. The United States is able to maintain its interests outside American territory: So why should such a policy be denied to Russia?

Girard: So what is the problem then?

Kravchuk: The problem with the Russians is their way of acting, the methods they use to defend their interests. Admittedly, Russian troops were already on the spot in all the conflicts you have just mentioned. Moscow did

not send in troops. These troops were faced with very delicate situations. But I believe that they should refrain from intervening in ethnic conflicts. Good intentions are needed on both sides. The local populations should not be too arrogant with regard to the Russians who have stayed behind and at the same time the Russians should renounce any temptations of imperialistic manipulations.

Girard: How are you going to explain to the Ukrainians that independence has meant heating and electricity cuts in the middle of winter?

Kravchuk: All countries have gone through difficult periods such as we are going through now. Independence is not the prime cause. It is the transition between two different systems of organizing society. You cannot change overnight from a planned, centralized economy to a market economy. We have chosen the Western model in order to obtain a new quality of life. That means breaking with a lot of things. Under the former system, the Ukrainian economy was fully integrated into the Soviet economy, of which it represented 20 percent. The division of labor—and not regional autonomy—was the rule in the former USSR. We were specialized in processing industries. Under such conditions, how could we build up an independent economy?

Girard: You have debts of 2.5 billion dollars to Russia. This summer, the Russians had suggested that, in order to repay them, you should sell your share of the Black Sea fleet. Now they are calling for a share in Ukrainian companies. Do you consider these demands to be justified?

Kravchuk: We are going to set up mixed companies with a capital open to foreign investors. It is only natural to have industrial relations with Russia. Our companies need its oil, gas, raw materials. In return, we can offer it our refining and processing capacities. The two countries have everything on which to build mutually rewarding industrial relations.

Letter Sent To UN Secretary General

LD3011204593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 30 Nov 93

[Text] A meeting was held between Viktor Batyuk, permanent representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali at the UN's New York headquarters on 29 November. The permanent representative handed to the UN secretary general a letter from Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, that announces the ratification by Ukrainian Supreme Council of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol appended to it, and clarifies the contents, character, and reasons of the reservations made in it. It also requests the UN secretary general to encourage the process of negotiations on nuclear states granting security guarantees to Ukraine, which opens the way for Ukraine's attainment of non-nuclear status in the future.

It was emphasized during the conversation that the ratification of the START Treaty was another important step taken by Ukraine toward the attainment by it of the status of a nuclear-free state in the future.

Foreign Minister Outlines Stance

LD0112223193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 1 Dec 93

[Text] Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, who is taking part in the work of the CSCE session in Rome, held a news conference today.

He noted that unfounded accusations have been heard on the part of certain participants at the lofty forum to the effect that Ukraine has supposedly declared itself a nuclear state. However, the minister of foreign affairs emphasized, Ukraine does not want and has never desired to acquire operational control over nuclear weapons. The nuclear button is located in Moscow, and one should not forget this. For Ukraine nuclear weapons are material wealth, in which the labor of the Ukrainian people has been invested. There is, therefore, every ground for demanding just compensation, Anatoliy Zlenko stated.

The minister explained Ukraine's stance regarding the nuclear weapons located on its territory. The decision of the Supreme Council on ratification of the START I Treaty, he said, opens the way to gradual elimination of nuclear arsenals. The world should realize this, understand it, and take a step to meeting Ukraine halfway.

The head of the foreign policy department stressed that giving Ukraine appropriate guarantees of security and economic assistance on the part of the world community would remove all obstacles from Ukraine's path to acceding to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Touching on the issue of giving Russia a mandate for peace-making operations on the territory of the former USSR, the minister of foreign affairs emphasized that a reliable mechanism to control such operations needs to be created, which should only involve multinational forces. The television and radio agency Novyny reported this at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

Nation 'Not Bound' by NPT

AU1611173793 Paris AFP in English 1722 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, Nov 16 (AFP)—Ukraine does not consider itself bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains a nuclear state, according to a draft resolution drawn up by parliament, a senior parliamentary official said here Tuesday.

The resolution, drawn up Tuesday and due to be discussed in the coming days, said Ukraine "does not consider itself bound by clause 5 of the (1992) Lisbon Protocol," which stipulates the total denuclearisation of

Ukraine and its adhesion to the NPT, Vladimir Kalinyets, a member of the parliamentary working group, told AFP.

However the resolution would ratify the START I treaty, which would involve scrapping 36 percent of the long-range missiles inherited by Ukraine from the former Soviet Union and 41.6 percent of their warheads.

Defense Ministry Details Reduction of Conventional Arms

LD1911174393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 19 Nov 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry press service reports that on 18 November Ukraine embarked on the second year of arms and equipment reduction conducted in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. Since the document took effect, more than 160 fighting planes, 630 armored fighting vehicles, and over 600 tanks have been or are being scrapped. Of these, 150 pieces of equipment have been redesigned for nonmilitary use, specifically as fire appliances, all-purpose haulage units, and lifting cranes. Over 400 more tanks, almost 900 armored fighting vehicles, and about 400 fighting planes are subject to elimination.

Government May Scrap More Carrier-Rockets, Warheads

LD2311135293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1327 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Suprun]

[Text] Moscow, November 23 (TASS)—"Ukraine does not rule out the possibility of scrapping additional carrier-rockets and nuclear warheads over and above the limits fixed by the START-I Treaty, but our desire to accelerate its fulfillment still does not meet with an adequate response from our partners," Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Vladimir Kryzhanovsky told a press conference here today. It was devoted to the Ukrainian ratification of the START-I Treaty.

"However, we shall fulfil exactly as many of our commitments as we have assumed in conformity with this document," he added.

"The Ukrainian Parliament's decision," Kryzhanovsky noted, "should be regarded as our state's important step towards the phased liquidation of all the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Ukraine has to cut by 30 per cent the number of carrier-rockets and by 42 per cent the strategic nuclear warheads inherited from the former USSR and now deployed on its territory. More than 80 warheads have already been disassembled and are on their way to Russia."

"Ukraine's hopes to get support from the world community, primarily from the nuclear and other influential powers, have still not materialised: It has still not

received reliable guarantees of its security and the promised aid is obviously insufficient. The problem of compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons moved to the territory of Russia has not been decided too. If the reaction will be adequate to our lawful demands, we shall do everything to step up the process of Ukraine's advancement towards a nuclear-free status," the ambassador stated. "We feel the Clinton administration's great desire, though it is still insufficient, to meet us halfway. In any case this desire is greater than that of our brother—Russia," Kryzhanovsky said.

Official Views Difficulties in Implementing CFE

AU1811084693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
16 Nov 93 p 5

[Article by Volodymyr Byelashov, deputy chief of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for Control Over Armament and Disarmament: "Through Disarmament Toward a New Europe"—first paragraph published in italics]

[Text] One year ago, on 13 November, the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] was signed. The treaty, elaborated as far back as during the times of the "Cold War" and confrontation between two political systems, became effective immediately after the collapse of the USSR, having become a kind of bridge between the period of hostility and the period of cooperation on the continent.

The CFE Treaty limits the quantity of the main categories of conventional weapons and technology—tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems (100-mm or larger), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, and envisages a mechanism for inspection and control over its implementation. The treaty also established an open procedure for exchanging relevant military information. The main objective of the document is to lower the level of armaments and to rule out any sudden wide-scale offensive on the part of any country that is a signatory to the treaty.

The treaty limits both the technology and the numerical strength of the armed forces. For Ukraine, these figures are as follows: 4080 tanks, 5050 armored combat vehicles, 4040 artillery systems, 1090 combat aircraft, 330 attack helicopters, and 450,000 servicemen. In terms of these indexes, Ukraine's army is between the second and third strongest in Europe after Russia and, possibly, in terms of some indexes, also after Germany, France, and Turkey. This is quite sufficient for effectively ensuring our country's defense.

Since the treaty began to be implemented, Ukrainian enterprises have destroyed 567 tanks, 630 armored combat vehicles, and 164 combat aircraft. It is primarily obsolete models of weapons and technology that have completed their service life and must be used as scrap that are being destroyed. Some of the technology has been converted into tractors, tow trucks, and so on.

The work of the Joint Consultative Group [JCG], created to promote the proper fulfillment of the CFE Treaty, is continuing. The Ukrainian delegation to the JCG managed to have the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously on the territory of a member country reduced. More than 100 foreign delegations have visited Ukraine since the treaty began to be implemented.

The Ukrainian delegation also proposed an initiative in the JCG on the need to settle the problem of so-called "flank limitations." In Ukraine, the territory of the former Odessa Military District, which accounts for 23 percent of the entire territory of the country, falls under these additional limitations. In accordance with the Tashkent agreement on the principles and procedure for the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty by those countries that are successors to the former USSR, Ukraine may have 680 combat tanks, with just 280 of them in combat units, 350 armored combat vehicles, 890 artillery systems, with just 390 of the latter within regular troops.

The "flank limitations" were an additional measure taken when the situation in Europe was characterized by an acute confrontation between two alliances. However, now, these limitations only apply to two states—Ukraine and Russia.

From the time the treaty was signed (November 1990) until it began effective (June 1992), global changes took place on the European continent: The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist and new independent states emerged on the territory of the former USSR. In other words, the ratification of the treaty took place in a new military and political situation, although it was signed as a compromise between two antagonistic alliances. Therefore, "flank limitations" are presently a serious obstacle to the normal operation and deployment of Ukraine's Armed Forces. In order to comply with this limitation, which is artificial in the new conditions, Ukraine would not only be unable to deploy its armed forces logically and effectively, but would also be compelled to resort to huge additional expenditure. It would be necessary to abandon the well equipped military facilities in the Odessa Military District and build new ones in the Carpathian or Kiev military districts. In view of the present economic difficulties, this is simply impossible.

Thus, the problem of "flank limitations" needs to be urgently resolved.

Today, Ukraine also has some other difficulties with the implementation of the CFE Treaty. The main obstacles for us are the shortage of money and the inadequate material and technological base. Owing to the difficult financial situation, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense is unable to ensure the participation of military specialists in the work of the JCG on a permanent basis, and this narrows down the possibilities for the Ukrainian delegation to defend the interests of our state to the fullest degree. The insufficient equipment and, again, the shortage of money stand in the way of proper inspection

activity. For example, in the first stage of fulfilling the CFE Treaty, Ukraine did not use its quota of inspections.

Even though strict control over the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty and the reduction of weapons and technology is an important element in the implementation of the treaty, they are not the sole factors that make the

treaty essential for establishing a new order in Europe. The exchange of military information, military openness, and confidence in the meticulous fulfillment of the treaty will contribute to strengthening trust, and this in turn will enhance security on the continent. In such conditions, the treaty will really become a reliable foundation wall for a new Europe.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EC Parliament Unblocks Dual-Use Technology Regulation

BR1511143293 Zellik *BELGIAN BUSINESS ET INDUSTRIE* in French Nov 93 p 63

[Unattributed article: "Dual-Use Technologies"]

[Text] During its September session, the European Parliament approved a European Commission proposal which had been blocked for months aiming to harmonize legislation in member states on export controls on certain dual-use goods and technologies (civil and military). The Parliament had blocked this dossier following the refusal by the Council of Ministers to communicate the annexes which included lists of products and destinations subject to restrictions. When the 12 member states finally decided to split the two documents, reserving an intergovernmental conference the right to decide on the lists, the Parliament "de facto" lost all possibility of intervention. The Parliament has therefore unblocked the regulation but has not given up completely: A regulation is not valid unless it is accompanied by practical instructions, members of the European Parliament pointed out. They are therefore demanding that the Council presents, within the framework of its future foreign policy decisions, the lists in question.

GERMANY

Minister on CBW Threat

AU2311123193 Munich *FOCUS* in German 22 Nov 93 pp 54-56

[Interview with Minister of the Chancellery Bernd Schmidbauer by Michael Jach and Ulrich Reitz; place and date not given: "The Threat Is Real"]

[Text] **FOCUS:** The United States is drawing up plans for a NATO antimissile system. The enemy Soviet Union does not exist anymore. Who is threatening us?

Schmidbauer: Missiles with ABC [atomic, biological, and chemical] warheads are no longer utopian in a number of countries in the Near and Middle East. With a range of only 1,000 km, states from this area could directly threaten NATO countries.

What is particularly dangerous: The existing carrier systems are lagging behind in technology and, therefore, not particularly precise. To compensate for this military defect, somebody might be tempted to equip them with mass destruction means—nuclear, biological, chemical—which have an effect over large areas.

FOCUS: Theoretically, this is very plausible. But where is the real threat?

Schmidbauer: Have you already forgotten the two gulf wars? The use of Iraqi Scud-A missiles against Iran, then of the Scud-B with greater range against Israel...

FOCUS: This example does not count. Iraq had to disarm and is being monitored.

Schmidbauer: Together with North Korea, certain states are building a Scud-C missile, which is further developed and has a range of 1,000 km. In another case an ambitious missile program is being developed, which is also aiming at more modern solid-fuel missiles. Corresponding brochures announce that even long-range missiles will be offered in the near future.

At the same time, the critical countries are acquiring via covert routes the technology for the production of nuclear and chemical weapons—and are conducting research for biological weapons. Some nuclear programs are so comprehensive that they obviously go beyond the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

FOCUS: Thus, Bundeswehr soldiers must expect that they might be exposed to ABC weapons in future UN missions in the southern crisis belt?

Schmidbauer: Yes. In some regions of the world the threat of biological weapons and, above all, chemical weapons would be real for the Bundeswehr. Already in the war over Kuwait the allies had to adjust to this. Iraq used not only chemical agents of World-War-I quality against Iran but, for the first time in the history of war, it also used neurotoxins.

FOCUS: North Korea is on the point of becoming a nuclear power. Will the nuclear armament spiral now start in the Far East?

Schmidbauer: If the North Korean nuclear bomb cannot be prevented, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan will certainly reconsider their renunciation of nuclear weapons. Avoiding the spiral effect would then depend on the security guarantees by the classic nuclear powers, above all the United States.

FOCUS: All the world is talking about Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea. India and Pakistan are far more developed in terms of armament technology. Are these countries considered to be reliable?

Schmidbauer: Indeed, the situation between India and Pakistan is explosive. Both states are able to produce chemical combat agents and, to a limited extent, also nuclear weapons. And both of them are developing missiles. These countries are, however, subject to the same strict export controls in the western industrialized nations.

FOCUS: Business with mass destruction technology is flourishing nevertheless. Are the precautions taken by the industrialized states still useless?

Schmidbauer: They have become increasingly effective. Bottlenecks are developing for the dubious clients.

Therefore, these countries are moving on to helping each other. Larger Third World states are now delivering pre-products for chemical combat agents. However, highly developed production facilities, machine tools, and electronics can still be obtained only in the industrialized states.

FOCUS: What role do the countries of the former Warsaw Pact play in this?

Schmidbauer: Rumors about the passing on of sensitive technologies or materials, the sale of nuclear weapons, or the recruiting of scientists from the CIS have not been confirmed so far. We have concluded, however, that the process is getting into motion.

In individual cases eastern neighboring countries are already acting as suppliers of technical components and pre-products.

FOCUS: German companies earned dirty money in Libya and in Iraq. How good are our controls after this bitter lesson?

Schmidbauer: Even the U.S. Administration now calls them exemplary. There is no perfect protection, however, against the inventiveness of criminals. The methods of camouflage are becoming increasingly sophisticated.

FOCUS: Give us a few examples!

Schmidbauer: For instance modern uranium-core kinetic energy rounds for fighting against tanks. They are considered to be relatively unproblematic "conventional" ammunition. Allegedly for their development, Iraq acquired know-how in uranium metallurgy, which went far beyond this purpose. In the years from 1985 to 1989 a large foreign bank forged export documents for Iraq and issued covert armament loans of \$5 billion. There were many reports about cover firms that worked in Germany.

Government and legislator in Germany have taken strict countermeasures as a result of such machinations.

FOCUS: They are so strict that German companies now complain that the stricter export controls even damage legal trade. Are we strangling ourselves on the world market, because civilian goods can be used for military purposes?

Schmidbauer: Over the past two years Germany has set high standards in the controls of "dual-use" goods. Our allies expressly recognize that. On the other hand, it is not a matter of course that all important industrialized countries are acting with consistency in this respect.

CFE Accounting

First Year of Reductions Talled

94UM0063A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeri Kovalev: "Will We Forge Swords Into Plowshares? This Is Costing Belarus Very Dearly"]

[Text] A year ago the republic began fulfilling its commitments for reducing conventional weapons.

The first phase ends on 16 November as specified in the treaty. During that period, I was told at the National Agency for Monitoring and Inspections of the MO RB [Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus], 500 tanks, more than 400 BMP [infantry combat vehicles] and BTR [armored personnel carriers], and 20 or so aircraft have been "processed" at the Borisov Tank Repair Plant and at the special Stankovo and Lesnaya bases. The vast majority were turned into ordinary scrap metal. A small part of them were converted for use in the civilian economy.

The burden of disarmament proved to be far heavier for Belarus than anticipated at the beginning, however. Expectations that most of the cost of destroying the combat equipment could be recouped by obtaining quality metal from the armor proved to be excessively and unjustifiably optimistic. It turned out that the Belarussian metallurgists, who have neither adequate capacities nor the special equipment involved nor experience in smelting such quantities of armor, had bitten off more than they could chew.

Expenses involved in the "dismemberment" and conversion of the tanks and armored vehicles are growing not by the day but by the hour, so to speak. More than a billion rubles has already been spent out of the republic budget to "forge swords into plowshares." And these costs will continue to rise along with the rampant inflation.

In better times the republic would undoubtedly have come up with the money. Today, however, when it finds itself in the grip of an extremely severe economic and financial crisis, deeply in debt to the suppliers of gas and oil, and forced to spend many billions of rubles on mopping-up operations following the Chernobyl disaster. The cost of disarmament is becoming too much for it. It was no surprise when Stanislav Shushkevich, Belarussian head of state, insistently appealed to participants at a recent session of the Council of Europe to help the republic with the destruction of the excess weapons.

"That is only fair," says Major-General Viktor Bakar, chief of the National Agency for Monitoring and Inspections of the Republic of Belarus' Ministry of Defense. "Under the agreement, little Belarus has to eliminate 1.6 times as much combat equipment as the USA, Great

Britain and France combined. Was it Belarus which initiated the arms race? The NATO countries and former members of the Warsaw Pact are equally responsible for the accumulation of mountains of weapons on our planet. And if everyone in Europe is now equally interested in security, if the destruction of the excessive military arsenals is advantageous to every state, then all the participants in the CSCE should do their part."

'Snags' Over Weapons Counts

AU1711165293 Paris AFP in English 1622 GMT
17 Nov 93

[By Graham Brown]

[Text] Brussels, Nov 17 (AFP)—An East-West treaty to cut weapons stocks has run into two snags—2,000 missing tanks and heavy guns, plus requests from Russia and Ukraine to change the pact, a NATO official said here Wednesday.

In remarks coinciding with the deadline for completion of the first phase of the historic Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the official said there was concern among NATO countries that 2,000 of the 35,000 items of military equipment due to be destroyed by former Warsaw Pact members by November 1995 could not be accounted for.

The official was speaking after a three-day arms control seminar involving ambassadors and military officials from countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact.

Speaking on condition that he not be identified, the official said the missing items, mainly artillery pieces and tanks, should be somewhere in Russia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

"We cannot leave the issue unaccounted for. We need a credible explanation," he said.

The official said Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are in conflict over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, disputed the arms inventory figures. There are also ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.

The seminar was hosted by NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee, which has the job of supervising the weapons cuts mandated by the CFE treaty signed in Paris on November 17, 1991.

Under the treaty, the NATO countries will have to destroy 16,000 artillery pieces, tanks, armoured vehicles, fighter planes and helicopters, against 35,000 for the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

The official said that Russian representatives at the seminar had repeated Moscow's demand that the treaty be revised to allow Russia to keep more tanks in the volatile Caucasus region.

He said that Ukraine also wanted changes that would better reflect the division of weapons between Russia and Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.

Western members of NATO have dismissed the Russian request for a change in the treaty, first made in early October.

The official underlined this on Wednesday, and added: "We attach strict importance to full implementation of the treaty. ... We should not give the impression to anyone that we are sympathetic" to the Russian request.

He warned that many signatories to the CFE treaty had reservations about it, and that changes to satisfy one country would open a "Pandora's box" of demands for other changes.

But the NATO official maintained that the arms reductions under the CFE treaty were proceeding well. He called it "a big success story" despite hiccups such as an Armenian refusal to accept Turkish inspectors.

The official said that more than 15,000 items had already been taken out of operation over the last 16 months, but added: "We are short about 25 or 30 tanks in Russia."

NATO has modified its system of arms cuts verification to take account of the mutual suspicions among the countries of the former Soviet Union concerning each other's reductions, following the break-up of the Warsaw Pact.

Some of these countries are now more concerned about making sure that their former allies are meeting their arms cuts commitments than checking up on NATO.

The official said NATO had set up mixed inspection teams to give these countries a better chance to check up on their neighbours.

He said NATO had also made its "Verity" computerised arms control verification system available to its former Warsaw Pact adversaries.

Russia's CFE Stance Criticised

*AU1711161393 Paris AFP in English 1553 GMT
17 Nov 93*

[Text] Vienna, Nov 17 (AFP)—Russia has marred an otherwise successful global disarmament initiative by insisting that it must retain arms stocks for conflicts in the former Soviet Union, diplomats said Wednesday.

The comments came after the passing of a deadline at midnight Tuesday for the scrapping of 17,000 tanks, artillery pieces and warplanes in under the first phase of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

The disarmament pact, signed in Paris on November 17, 1990, represents the biggest voluntary destruction of conventional weapons in history, according to diplomats gathered here.

The pact called on signatories to destroy 25 percent of all weapons exceeding treaty limits within 16 months. Sixty percent of the surplus weaponry must be scrapped by November 1994 and the rest by November 17, 1995.

But Russia has asked to be let out of certain clauses of the pact in order to deal with conflicts on former Soviet soil, said Ruediger Hartmann, the head of the German delegation at negotiations here said.

"It is the most intense Russian campaign" since 1987 the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement on scrapping nuclear weapons, he said. "The campaign is being led above all by the Russian military," he told a small group of reporters.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote a letter to CFE signatories in September specifically asking for Article V of the pact to be suspended, allowing him to increase the number of tanks, armoured cars and artillery.

In particular Moscow is under military pressure in the northern Caucasus, and also north of Saint Petersburg.

Russia has said it needs a stock of 1,400 tanks, whereas the treaty sets a limit of 700, with a further 600 allowed in depots in the Saint Petersburg district, said Hartmann.

Ukraine has also asked for amendments to the treaty because of military pressures on its borders.

Moscow and Kiev have justified their demands by citing the instability of separatist forces in the Caucasus, and the dangers of the escalation of Moslem fundamentalism.

In response, Hartmann said, western nations have recently called on Moscow to specify its needs: Asking whether the conflicts were domestic or external, and whether there was a concrete threat in either case.

They also wanted to know how more tanks could tackle the spread of Moslem fundamentalism, and why Moscow wants heavy artillery and tanks for regions which are mostly mountainous, and therefore more accessible to light vehicles.

But, said Hartmann: "For the moment, Russia has given no answers." "We can see no easy solution... Nothing will happen so long as the situation in Moscow remains unclear. We await the results of the legislative elections in December."

One western expert said Tuesday that Russia's rate of disposing of tens of thousands of conventional weapons transferred behind the Urals also "remains very slow."

On Tuesday, praising the almost complete compliance with the first phase deadline, a high-ranking western

diplomat said: "It's the first time in the history of conventional disarmament that the excess accumulation of armaments has been recognized and the consequences... carried out."

He estimated the cost of scrapping the military hardware and converting some of it for peaceful use at "several tens of millions of dollars" a year.

Destroying a tank alone costs between 7,000 and 12,000 dollars, according to German sources.

After Russia, reunited Germany is the country with the most conventional military materiel to destroy. Bonn projected the operation would cost 220 million [German] marks (about 130 million dollars) this year.

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